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CHAPTER I 
THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate and extend the literature 
on the attribution of responsibility. Reider's (1958) levels of 
responsibility areextended, and their relationship to responsibility 
attribution, sanction assignment, and the attribution of emotion with 
moderate and intense negative outcomes is investigated. The effect of 
an observer's locus of control on these attributions and assignments 
is also explored. In addition, two methods of investigation are 
examined to determine if they have differential effects on these 
processes. 
A very significant aspect of our daily interactions are the 
characteristics that we attribute to other people. Some of the 
characteristics we attribute are enduring states, popularly called 
personality characteristics. Other attributions deal with temporary 
or momentary phenomena. Perhaps the most important of these is the 
attribution of causality. When an individual is seen to be associated 
with an event, there is a tendency to attribute the causation of that 
event to him. When this happens responsibility becomes an issue. 
The attribution of respons'ibility for an action is not always assigned 
to the individual who acted (Heider, 1958). Responsibility is sometimes 
attributed, at least in part, to environmental factors. 
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Understanding the attribution of responsibility is a necessary and 
important task for psychology. It holds implications both for our 
judicial system, and in our everyday behaviors. The extent to which 
we hold individuals responsible for their actions will affect our 
future and current interactions with them. If an individual harms us, 
intentionally, we respond differently to him than if he dealt us the 
same harm accidently. The harm is the same, what is different is the 
extent of responsibility we assign the person for the action. This 
in turn affects our future dealings with him. 
The literature on the attribution of responsibility is filled 
with contradictory results, and alternative explanations which appear 
to be independent of each other. Investigators have used several 
different methods, and have at times appeared to be unaware of the 
work of others and its consequences for them. The purpose of this 
investigation was to clear up some of these inconsistencies. 
First, this study examined two methods that have been used indis-
criminately in the attribution of responsibility. Both methods involve 
the presentation of short stories to the subjects. One method employs 
contextual stories which involve actual situations. The ,other method 
uses more abstract stories which do not describe a particular situation, 
but represents a class of situations. The possible consequences of 
the distinction between these two methods has not been previously 
investigated. 
Another purpose of this study was to examine and extend Reider's 
(1958) levels of the attribution of responsibility. Reider's level 
of "Foreseeable Commission" was broken down into ''Careless Commission," 
where foresight is never consciously considered, and "Selfish 
Commission" where foresight is considered but dismissed. The "Selfish 
Commission" level appears to be a necessary conceptual step between 
"Foreseeable Commission" and "Purposive Commission." 
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The third purpose of this study was to examine the manner in which 
individuals assign sanctions to others as a function of their respon-
sibility level. 
The fourth purpose of the investigation was to examine the 
attribution of emotion to individuals who have performed actions at 
different levels of responsibility. This phase examines how individuals 
perceive the feelings of an actor at different levels of responsibility. 
The effect of the intensity of a negative action outcome was also 
investigated in this study. Both moderate and severe negative outcomes 
were investigated as to their effect on the assignment of respon-
sibility, sanctions, and the attribution of emotion. This factor 
was expected to operate differentially at the different levels of 
responsibility. 
Finally, the study investigated the effect of an individual's 
perception of the locus of control of behavior on his perception of 
the responsibility of others. Rotter's (1966) Internal-External Locus 
of Control Scale was used to differentiate those individuals who viewed 
themselves in control of their own behavior from those who saw external 
factors as playing the determining role. This .kind of personality 
factor was expected to affect the attribution of responsibility, 
sanctions and emotions. 
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History of Responsibility Attribution 
Attribution theories have been quite popular in recent social 
psychological research. This area, while now diverse, received its 
heuristic thrust from the work of Fritz Heider. Heider was interested 
in the phenomenology of social behavior. The basis of Reider's 
position was the proposition that man perceives behavior as being 
caused. Michott (1963) performed several experiments which demonstrated 
that individuals do perceive causality immediately upon witnessing 
an event. 
Two major attribution theories appeared in the mid 1960's. These 
theories can be traced to Heider though both deal with different 
aspects of the attribution process. In 1965 Jones and Davis proposed 
their Theory of Correspondent Inferences. They were concerned with 
attributions to the individual and thus were concerned with internal 
causality. The theory deals with the attribution of dispositional 
traits to an actor. This attribution will occur when the action 
differs from normative expectations. When an action follows the norm 
an observer cannot be sure of the cause of the action. It could be 
due to the desires of the actor, or the constraints of the situation. 
An act which violates normative expectations can only have its source 
within the individual. Jones and Davis simplified their analysis by 
dealing with only part of what Heider proposed (1958). Only situations 
where the actor was aware of what effects would result from his actions, 
and where he had the ability to perform the actions were examined. 
Kelley (1967) proposed a Theory of External Attribution. Jones 
and Davis had been concerned with internal causality, the attribution 
to the person. Kelley was concerned with examining external causality 
and thus complemented the earlier theory. He was interested in 
investigating the non-personal variables that determine a choice. 
5 
In general he hypothesized that if an individual responds differentially 
when an entity is present than when it is absent, if he responds to it 
in a consistent manner, and if this same entity causes the same effect 
in everyone else, then it is the entity to which the causal attribution 
is made. To the extent that these conditions are not met, the causal 
attribution will be made to the individual. So, Kelley's theory is 
oriented toward ruling out personal sources of causal attribution 
while Jones and Davis' theory is oriented toward the ruling out of 
environmental or situationally determined causal attributions. 
The attribution of responsibility is both narrower and broader 
in.scope than the theories of Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967). 
It is narrower in scope because it deals with only one type of 
attribution, the attribution of responsibility. It is broader in 
scope because it deals with both internal and external attributions 
of causality. Attributions of responsibility can be shared by the 
person and his environment. The attribution of responsibility is more 
broad in scope than Jones and Davis' theory as the former deals with 
all of Reider's (1958) levels of responsibility while the-latter is 
concerned with only one level, foreseeable commission. 
Heider (1958) reported that the location-of perceived causality 
must reside either in the individual or in the environment. "Personal 
responsibility .• varies with the relative contributions of environmental 
factors to the action outcome; in general, the more they are felt to 
influence the action, the less the person is held responsible. (1958, 
p. 113)" He then went on to suggest five stages or levels in which 
attribution to the person decreases as attribution to the environment 
increases. 
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These levels begin with the most "primitive," and progress to more 
"sophisticated" levels. Level 1 is "Global Association." Here an 
individual is held responsible for any action that he is connected 
with in any way, and he does not need to personally act. With "Extended 
Commission," Level 2, an individual is held responsible for any effect 
that he produced by his actions, even though he could not possibly 
have foreseen that outcome. Here, however, the individual is a 
necessary condition for the happening because he does need to act. 
"Foreseeable Commission," Level 3, is where an individual is responsible 
for any foreseeable effect that he produced by his actions, even though 
the effect was not a part of his goals or intentions. Level 4 is 
"Purposive Commission." This is where an individual is held responsible 
for any effect that he produced by his actions, when he foresaw and 
intended to produce the outcome. The fifth level is "Justified 
Commission." At this stage an individual is held only partly 
responsible for actions that he intentionally produced. This happens 
when circumstances are such that most individuals would have felt and 
acted as he did. Here there are mitigating circumstances which reduce 
personal responsibility. 
Walster's (1966, 1967) work in the attribution of responsibility 
appears to have developed independently of Heider (1958). Walster 
(1966) found that adults tend to hold others more responsible for 
"accidents" that have severe consequences, than for accidents that 
have more moderate outcomes. In her study, subjects' ratings of 
responsibility were for an action that occurs at the level which 
Heider (1958) would call extended commission. That is, there was no 
way that the acting individual in Walster's study could have foreseen 
the outcome of his behavior. It is possible, therefore, that greater 
attribution of responsibility with severe as opposed to moderate 
outcomes may not occur at other levels of attribution (Heider, 1958) 
where foresight, intentionality, justification, or the absence of 
commission are involved. 
There is some evidence that this may be the case. In another 
study, Walster (1967) found that subjects did not attribute more 
responsibility to the acting agent for severe as opposed to moderate 
outcomes. In this study, however, the acting agent had foresight of 
all possible outcomes of his behavior. So this situation involved 
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a more "sophisticated" level of attribution, foreseeable commission, 
than the first study. Thus the different results may be due to shifting 
the level of attribution, a possibility Walster failed to consider. 
Shaver (1970b) also reports finding no increase in the attribution of 
responsibility with severe as opposed to moderate outcomes. His study 
also involved a situation where the acting agent had foresight of 
possible outcomes and thus involves foreseeable commission. 
It may be that Walster's (1967) and Shaver's (1970b) findings are 
not due to the foreseeability factor alone. It is possible that their 
results are due to the idiosyncracies in their story situations, as 
indicated by the evidence that an increase in outcome intensity does 
lead to an increase in the attribution of responsibility. Several 
investigations (Shaw & Sulzer, 1964; Shaw, 1967; Sulzer & Burglass, 
1968; Shaw & Reitan, 1969; Shaw & Schneider, 1969a, 1969b) have 
demonstrated this increase in studies which did use Reider's (1958) 
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five levels of attribution. However, these studies did not report the 
effect of increased intensity of outcome on attribution of responsibility 
at each level. This leaves open the possibility that this relationship 
is due to an outcome intensity difference at just a few of the levels, 
but not necessarily all of them. It is also conceivable that lack of 
foresight is sometimes excusable and other times most inexcusable. 
Sanctioning and Responsibility 
Once an individual is assigned responsibility for an action he 
becomes open to sanctions for that action. Very little work has been 
reported on sanction assignment. Shaw and Reitan (1969) report an 
investigation of sanctioning assignment as it relates to the attribution 
of responsibility. In their presentation they refer to an earlier, 
unpublished work by Sulzer (1964). Sulzer had stated that the 
attribution of responsibility to a person provides the basis for 
sanctioning that person. He also stated that sanctioning behavior, 
just as responsibility attribution, was influenced by both responsibility 
level (Heider, 1958) and outcome intensity. He presented some evidence 
that the attribution of responsibility for an action and the assignment 
of sanctions were correlated but not identical. 
Shaw and Reitan (1969) investigated some of Sulzer's (1964) 
propositions. They stated that attribution of responsibility should 
be a necessary but not sufficient condition for sanctioning. If an 
individual is not responsible for something, he should not be 
sanctioned for it. If he is responsible, then he may or may not be 
sanctioned for it. According to Shaw and Reitan if these propositions 
are true, then the level of sanction assignment should sometimes be 
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less than the level of responsibility attribution, but never more. 
Their investigation of the discrepancy between the attribution of 
responsibility and the assignment of sanctions indicated that sanctioning 
behavior was never more than the attribution of responsibility. The 
discrepancy between responsibility attribution and sanction assignment 
was found to be the least at Global Association and Purposive 
Commission. They concluded that the attribution of responsibility 
was the basis for the assignment of sanctions. They also found 
sanctioning behavior to be more sensitive than the attribution of 
responsibility to outcome intensity. When the outcome was more 
intense, more sanctioning occurred. Similar sanctioning behaviors 
were anticipated for the present study. 
Attribution of Emotion 
No work has been reported on the emotional state attributed to 
an actor as a result of his attributed action. One could reasonably 
expect an observer to attribute positive affective feelings to the 
individual who is associated with or responsible for positive things 
occurring. It is possible that the relationship is not so simple 
when negative outcomes are involved. Individuals who have 
justifiably, intentionally, or selfishly caused negative outcomes may 
be seen as feeling less bad about the occurrence than individuals at 
the other responsibility levels. The individual who has justifiably 
caused a negative outcome will feel less bad because the environment 
shares the blame. He has some degree of normative approval for what 
he did. Individuals who cause a negative outcome either intentionally 
or through overt negligence have performed a socially unacceptable act. 
According to Jones and Davis (1965), when an act is socially inappro-
priate, observers are more likely to use it to infer a dispositional 
characteristic of the actor. Following this, an individual who has 
intentionally caused a negative outcQme or who was consciously aware 
that this negative outcome might accrue if he acted should be seen by 
observers as a more selfish or debase person. They should therefore 
attribute less negative feelings to this person for what he did 
because of their perception of his heartlessness as a rather stable 
personality trait. It is also reasonable to expect that individuals 
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who have been·associated with or caused severe negative outcomes should 
be attributed more negative emotions for their actions than individuals 
who caused or were associated with more moderate outcomes. 
Individual Differences 
Concepts of individual differences present a relatively unexplored 
area in studies of the attribution of responsibility. Most of the 
literature in the attribution of responsibility has dealt only with 
the characteristics of the stimulus situation. Only three studies 
have investigated the effect that personal differences might have on 
the attribution of responsibility. 
Sulzer and Burglass (1968) investigated the effect of empathy and 
punitiveness on the attribution of responsibility. Their research 
indicated that more punitive and less empathetic individuals were 
more.likely to hold others responsible for carelessly produced 
outcomes and justified outcomes. They claimed that the attribution 
of personal responsibility thus depends on both the perceived 
characteristics of the stimulus situation, and the personal characteristics 
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of the attributor. However, in another study, Shaw and Schneider (1969) 
found no evidence to support the contenJion that intelligence was 
related to the attribution of responsibility. They concluded that 
only a minimum amount of ability was necessary to learn the culturally 
prescribed method for appropriate responsibility attribution and 
sanction assignment. 
A,personality variable that might be expected to affect both the 
attribution of responsibility and sanctioning behavior is the 
attributor's perceived locus of control. Rotter (1966) and his 
associates designed a scale to measure the degree to which an individual 
believes he can intentionally affect certain consequences (internal 
locus of control) as opposed to those consequences occurring beyond 
the individual's control (external locus of control), This scale is 
called the Internal-External Locus of Control Scale. A substantial 
body of literature (reported by Lefcourt, 1966a and 1966b; Joe, 1971; 
and others) indicates that the personality variable assessed by 
Rotter's scale,, can have predictable consequences for behaviors and 
social expectations. With regard to responsibility attribution, 
Phares and Wilson (1972) investigated the effect of Internal-External 
locus of control and the attribution of responsibility in ambiguous 
and structured situations. Although an expected interaction between 
I-E and story ambiguity failed to materialize, the results indicated 
that internals attributed greater levels of responsibility than 
externals. Thus Phares and Wilson found that internally oriented 
people tend to see not only themselves as responsible for events, but 
also hold others responsible for their own behaviors. Conversely, 
externals tend to attributed less responsibility to themselves and 
• 
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to others. Therefore, an individual's own locus of control orientation 
might provide a basis for predicting his beliefs concerning the locus 
of control of others, and hence others' level of responsibility for 
outcomes. 
Foreseeability 
Heider (1958) says that the third attribution level (foreseeable 
commission) is where an individual is held responsible for any after-
effect that he might have foreseen even though it was not a part of 
his own goal. He goes.on to say "That he was not deterred from 
pursuing his goal by the thought of harm to others is taken as a sign 
that he is ruthless .•. A nicer person would not have carried out the 
action. The moral restraining forces were· lacking in actor. (p. 113)" 
No distinction is made as to whether or not "foresight" ever consciously 
occurred although this is a potentially important factor. 
An individual who has foresight of alternative outcomes and who 
acts anyway is likely to be held more responsible for that outcome 
than an individual who could have foreseen.it but failed to. Heider 
(1958, p.: 113) says that this is the stage where an individual is held 
responsible for any after effect that he might have foreseen. This 
implies that the individual did not foresee the outcome. He goes on 
to say, however, that the individual was not deterred from pursuing 
his goal by the thought that he might harm another (p. 113). This 
implies that the individual foresaw the outcome but dismissed the 
pos~ibility of its occurrence and acted in a selfish manner. These 
are thus two distinct situations which in this paper will be separated 
into two distinct levels. The first will be called "Careless Commission." 
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Here the alternative possible outcomes were never even considered by 
the actor, although he might have foreseen them had he attempted to do 
so. The second level will be called "Selfish Commission." Here there 
was conscious consideration of the alternative possible outcomes or 
by-products of acting. These were, however, dismissed or ignored and 
the action was pursued anyway. With oversight commission, the individual 
is guilty only of not being more vigilant. With selfish commission 
the individual is guilty of being ruthless or inconsiderate. Therefore, 
although this study investigated the attribution of responsibility 
using Reider's (1958) levels as a general guide, Reider's third level 
was separated into two levels. Personal responsibility for an action 
could be expected to be higher for selfish commission than for oversight 
commission. 
Methodological Problems 
As previously mentioned, studies in the attribution of responsibility 
have used two different types of stimulus items. Walster (1966, 1967); 
Shaver (1970b); Shaw and Sulzer (1964); Shaw (1967); Shaw and Reitan 
(1969); Sulzer and Burglass (1968); and Phares and Wilson (1972) have 
all used contextual stories. These stories each involved a particular 
situation to which the subject must attribute responsibility. A second 
method, used by Shaw and Schneider (1969a, 1969b), involved abstract 
stories which merely represent a class of situations, but which did not 
provide descriptive contextual content. 
An example of a contextual story is provided by Shaw and Sulzer 
(1964): 
Perry opened the door so that the wind would blow the 
children's papers all over the room. Is Perry responsible 
for the scattered papers? 
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The abstract story, lacking contextual description, is illustrated 
by the following example from Shaw and Schneider (1970a): 
Steve caused something to happen that was a little bit 
bad. He intended to cause it. Is Steve responsible 
for the bad thing that he caused? 
Both of these stories represent.a negative outcome at the level of 
purposive commission. 
It is possible that these two types of stories may lead to 
different results. Before they continue to be used interchangeably, 
their equivalence should be demonstrated. Conceptually, at least, it 
is possible that they deal with different levels of processing. With 
the contextual stories, the subject must decide-what "factors" are 
present. It is up to him to decide whether or not there was foresight, 
intent or justification. This is acceptable if perception of these 
variables is being studied. The literature on the attribution of 
responsibility, however, has used these stories to investigate the 
manner in which individuals assign responsibility when these factors 
are present. Whether or not they are indeed "present" is left up to 
the perception of the subject. If subjects differ in their perception 
of foresight, intent, or justification factors, then the investigator 
has potentially serious error variance in his study. With the more 
abstract stories, the individual is told what factors are present. 
Thus, the mediating factor of the subjects' perception is eliminated. 
One should then be able to investigate the effect of the various. levels 
of foreseeability, intent, and justification more accurately with the 
abstract stories. However, this remains to be determined. 
As part. of this investigation, it was decided to examine both of 
these methods. Constructing the abstract stories was a fairly simple 
task. They were similar to examples provided by Shaw and Schneider 
(1970a). The form of these stories can be seen in Appendix B. 
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Constructing contextual stories was more difficult. Previous 
investigations, such as by Shaw and Sulzer (1964), had constructed 
stories to represent Reider's (1958) levels and received agreement from 
three independent judges that these stories were at the appropriate 
level of responsibility and had the appropriate outcome. The present 
investigator replicated this procedure in a preliminary (pilot) study. 
Agreement was obtained from three independent judges. The story 
development was then taken a step further when the stories were 
presented to 39 subjects in an attempt to see if they could ascertain 
the level of the story and its outcome. Subjects were given instructions 
and examples of Reider's (1958) levels and then asked to rate the 
level to which they felt each story belonged and the outcomes of the 
story. An 80% agreement level was arbitrarily selected as acceptable. 
On only five of the 20 stories did the subject agree with the three 
independent judges at the 80% level on both levels of responsibility 
and outcome intensity. The range of agreement was from 21.2% and 
92.3% for outcame intensity, and from 21.2% to 100% for responsibility 
level. Thus, in tests conducted on the prospective subject population, 
perceptions of the factors (foreseeability, intent, justification) that 
were present in a given contextual story varied tremendously. 
A second generation of stories was developed in an attempt to 
derive stories that wou,ld lead to better agreement. With 17 subjects, 
again only five stories of the 20 tested reached the 80% level of 
16 
agreement on responsibility level and outcome intensity. Only two of 
these were new stories. Two stories which had reached acceptable 
agreement in the first attempt failed to reach agreement upon replica-
tion. The range of agreement here was from 5.9% to 100% for outcome 
intensity, and from 41.2% to 94.1% for responsibility level. 
A third generation of 20 stories was developed. With 18 subjects 
only three of these reached the 80% level of agreement. Here the range 
of agreement was from 72.2% to 100% for story outcome intensity, and 
from 22.2% to 100% for level of responsibility. 
The level of acceptability was then lowered to 70% agreemerrt on 
story level and outcome. With this new arbitrary criterion, generation 
number four produced 12 usable stories, one for each of the two possible 
outcomes (slightly bad and very bad) at six levels of responsibility 
in a pilot test with 19 subjects. These stories were used in the 
present study and appear in Appendix A along with their percentages 
of agreement. 
With situational stories, one becomes involved with subjects' 
perceptions. What is not foreseeable to one subject may be judged 
as foreseeable by another. What is seen as justified by one subject 
may not be seen as justified by another. It is tenuous indeed to 
study the effect of a justified act on the attribution of responsibility 
when in fact a large percentage of subjects may not view it as justified. 
There are several "rules of thumb" an investigator should keep in 
mind in designing contextual stories. The major problem areas in 
obtaining interjudge agreement on story levels were in distinguishing 
between extended commission and careless commission, and in eliciting 
judgments of justified commission. The critical factor in distinguishing 
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between extended commission and careless commission is the possibility 
of foresight. There appeared to be a tendency for subjects, at least 
with negative outcomes, to perceive those negative outcomes as 
foreseeable. To obtain agreement on extended commission, the inves-
tigator must be sure to impart all possible due caution to the actor 
in the story. Careless commission, of course, does not involve all 
due caution and therefore neglect is important here. 
What distinguishes justified commission from purposive commission 
is the idea of justification for the intended action. Therefore it 
is important for the investigator to emphasize situational constraints 
when he wishes to communicate-a justified commission situation. 
Situational constraints should be eliminated when purposive commission 
is desired. 
Obtaining subject agreement on story level was not the only 
problem. There was also difficulty in getting subject agreement on 
what constituted a severe outcome. Some stories led to consJderable 
interjudge variability as to whether the outcomes were slightly bad 
or very bad. This alone could account for the fact that some studies 
report that severe outcomes lead to more responsibility (Walster, 1966) 
while others (Walster, 1967; Shaver, 1970b) have not found that 
relationship. Perhaps the subjects in the latter studies did not view 
the outcome as serious. Rather extreme outcome examples were needed 
to reduce variability with respect to perception of an outcome's 
severity, especially with extremely negative outcomes. There appeared 
to be a comparison process at work with the determination of an 
outcome's severity. Subjects seemed to compare the actual outcome 
with possible outcomes in their judgment of an outcome's severity. 
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Subjects may not see a broken back.as serious if they think the subject 
escaped being killed and was lucky to be alive. An outcome that ends 
in death should be avoided since it can create a comparison process 
with other story outcomes reducing the perception of their severity. 
There are some further factors an investigator needs to consider 
when using contextual stories. There is the possibility that 
individuals assign responsibility in a different manner when there 
is property damage involved and ~nen there is bodily harm. There is 
also the possibility that individuals assign responsibility differently 
when the story's actor is the affected party than when a third person 
is affected. It is also possible that there are sex and cross sex 
differences in responsibility attribution. 
Another problem noted ~as the difficulty of attaining proper 
levels of agreement with stories that had a legal tone to them such 
as assigning responsibility for a car accident. Perhaps when a 
situation is used which involves some sort of legality, other factors 
become involved in the attribution of responsibility. These ideas were 
tested with 18 pi~ot study subjects. There were asked to judge the 
1\ 
- level of responsibility for Walster's (1966) story about Lennie' car 
rolling down the hill. 17% rated it as global association; 17% saw 
it as extended commission; 28% said it was careless commission; 34% saw 
it as selfish commission; and 6% said it was justified commission. This 
illustrates the possible danger of using situational stories that are 
not properly developed. Each story has its own unique characteristics.I 
r 
This is certainly a possible explanation for the-contradictory results 
in the literature. 
Most of the problems are avoided when the abstract stories are 
used. The subjects are told wh~t factors are present, and told the 
! 
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intensity of the outcome. In this way the study of the effect of these 
factors is enhanced. Without empirical determination these facto.rs 
may not even be present in contextual stories. If this happens the 
investigation may not be dealing with what it says it is. 
Statement of the Problem 
The literature on the attribution of responsibility and related 
topics contains many unresolved and unexplored areas. Since it appears 
that responsibility attribution, sanction assignment, and the attribution 
of emotion play important parts in our day to day interactions, this 
investigation examined some of the factors related to these behaviors. 
First, the two story methods were examined. Half of the subjects 
received pretested contextual stories which described a particular 
episode. The remaining subjects received abstract stories which 
contained only the basic; elemeJ;ltS needed to represent a particular 
level of responsibility. There was no reason to expect either 
s:-imilari ties or differences between these methods. An· empirical 
determination of their relationship was, however, necessary. 
He.ider' s level of foreseeable commission was broken down into 
careless commission and selfish commission. With careless commission 
an individual has no foresight of the outcome of his actions although 
foresight was possible with more care, awareness, or vigilance. 
Selfish commission occurs when there is conscious foresight of an 
outcome. The person acts regardless of this foresight, however, and 
though not intending to, produces the outcome. It was expe~ted that 
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selfish commission would lead to a greater attribution of responsibility, 
larger sanction assignment, and an attribution of more affectively 
positive feelings than careless commission. 
With the addition of a new level of Reider's (1958) levels of 
responsibility it was also desirable to replicate the pattern of 
responsibility attribution through all the levels and demonstrate that 
selfish commission fit· into the pattern between careless and purposive 
commission. Personal attribution of responsibility should increase 
from global association through purposive commission, and decrease 
at justified commission. Sanction assignment was expected to follow 
the same pattern. 
The re~tionship between the attribution of responsibility and 
the intensity of a negative outcome was also examined. As previously 
mentioned, there are s.everal inconsistent findings on the interaction 
of these variables. It was argued here that outcome severity would 
affect responsibility attribution at only some of the levels (Heider, 
\ 
1958) of responsibility. To the extent that an individual's guilt 
or innocence for an action can be clefrly determined, the severity 
of an outcome will not affect the attribution of responsibility to 
the person. Thus, at global association, where the indivicfuaI is 
innocent of any action, and at purposive commission where his intention 
to act is obvious, no increase was expected in the attribution of 
responsibility as an outcome increased in severity. One is either 
guilty or he isn't at these levels. 
In those situations where there is some doubt as to the individual's 
culpability, more intense outcomes should lead to a greater attribution 
of responsibility. Here the tendency to hold others more responsible 
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for more serious outcomes can operate because of the vagueness of the 
situation. When individuals are unsure of the level of responsibility, 
the tendency should be to assign more responsibility as outcomes 
increase in intensity. Thus there should be an increase in the 
attribution of responsibility with severe as opposed to more moderate 
outcomes at extended commission, careless commission, selfish commission, 
and justified commission. These are the levels where blame is shared 
by the individual and the environment to the greatest extent. The 
increase at these levels was expected in this study. 
As with the attribution-of responsibility and outcome intensity, 
the assignment of sanctions was expected to be affected by outcome 
severity at some but not all levels of responsibility. The predictions 
were the same here, as with the attribution of responsibility. Again, 
' ,:., 
where there is l;t'.ft:le doubt as to an individual's innocence or guilt 
(global association. and purposive cotmnission, respectiv.ely) an increase 
in the severity of an.outcome should not lead to an increase in sanctions. 
In the situations where-an individual's culpability is vague a more 
serious behavioral outcomes should lead to an increase in sanctioning 
behavior. This relationship was expe~.f:~d at extended commission, 
careless cotmnission, selfish cotmnission, and justified commission. 
With the attributionof emotion, it was expected that subjects will 
assign increasingly more negative feelings to individuals as the level 
of responsibility increases from global association to careless 
cotmnission. However, less negative affect would be attributed to 
individuals at selfish, purposive, and justified commission. Individuals 
acting at the purposive commission level should be-attributed the least 
negative feelings for their actions since they have achieved an intended 
action. Individuals were also expected to attribute-more.negative 
feelings for serious out~mes than for more moderate outcomes at 
1· 
global association, extended commission, and careless commission. 
However, they should attribute-less negative feelings as outcome 
intensity increases at selfish, purposive and justified commission. 
Individuals showing internal locus of control were-expected to 
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attribute greater responsibility to others for their actions than were 
individuals with an external locus of control. Individuals with an 
· internal locus of control should also assign more sanctions and 
attribute more extreme affective states than those with an external 
locus of control. These effects should be most apparent at·those 
levels where there is some uncertainty as to the-extent of personal 
responsib.ility (extended, careless, selfish, and justified commission), 
Finally as an exploratory and-explanatory phase, the-relationship 
between the attribution of responsibility, sanction assignment, and 
the attribution of emotion was determined at each·of the levels of 
responsibility and outcome intensities. 
CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
Subjects 
Xhe subjects were 23 female and 17 male Oklahoma State University 
students who were enrolled in undergraduate psychology courses. For 
their participation in the study, subjects received extra credit in 
the courses they were taking. 
Instruments 
Subjects were administe:fed the Rotter Internal-External Locus of 
'\• 
Control Scale (1966) along with one of two different sets of 12 short 
stories. One set of stories described a particular situation, while 
the other set consisted of stories that were in an abstract format. 
Each set of 12 stories consisted of all possible combinations of the 
six levels of attribution of responsibility and the two intensities of 
negative story outcome (moderate and severe). Half of the stories in 
each set were concerned with a female principle while the remaining 
stories had a male principle (See Appendices A and B). 
Each story was followed by three rating scales on which the 
subject recorded his responses. Each story and its three rating 
scales were reproduced on a separate 8~" by 5~11 separate piece of 
paper. 
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The abstract story format and the rating scales that followed 
them can be seen in the following example: 
Greta caused something to happen that was very bad. She intended 
to cause it. 
Who is responsible for this very bad thing? 
I I I I I 
......................................... 
Greta 
Greta should be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 
......................................... 
Punished 
a lot 
Greta feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I I I I I 
......................................... 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
This example represents a story at the level of purposive commission 
with a severe negative outcome. 
An example of the situational stories is: 
Charles deliberately picked up one of his brother's empty soft 
drink bottles and threw it against the sidewalk where it shattered. 
Who is responsible for the shattered soft drink bottle? 
I I I I I 
e O O e O O O O e e e O O • • • fl • e • e f I e e e • e e • e e e • e e I • e e • 
Charles 
Charles should be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 
e e • e e • • e e e • e • • e e • e e e • I • I I e • • e e e • e e e • e e f • • 
Punished 
a lot 
Charles feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I I I I I 
• 0 e e • I •• e • e • e • • • • • I e e e • e • I e e I • • e e e e f I I • I I 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
This example represents a story at the level of purposive commission 
with a moderate negative outcome. 
Procedure 
The subjects were tested individually and in groups of no larger 
than five. A male experimenter met the subj~Fts and tooj them into a 
small classroom where they were seated facing a blackboard. On the 
blackboard were examples of each of the three rating scales that 
followed each story. 
The experimenter told the subjects that he was interested in 
25 
studying the ways in which individuals assign responsibility. Subjects 
were told that responsibility was a factor that could be shared; 
individuals can be held completely responsible for what happened or 
they can share the responsibility with others, or the situation in 
which they find themselves. The experimenter also made the following 
comments: 
We are all familiar with sayings such as "He didn't 
mean to do that," "She didn't know any better," "He 
had a right to do that," and so on. Each of these has 
the effect of reducing the personal responsibility of 
the individual. As another example, let's take the 
situation where a mother tells her 10 year-old son to 
make his bed, which he does. How responsible is the 
child for the fact that the bed gets made? If left 
entirely up to him the bed probably would not get 
made at all. So here the mother takes some of the 
responsibility for getting the bed made. 
Subjects were then told that they were going to read 12 very short 
stories and were going to answer three questions about each story. 
Examples of the three questions they were to answer could be seen on 
the board in front of them. 
The first rating scale example was the following: 
Who is responsible for ? 
' ' ' ' ' .. " ..................................... . 
The 
Person 
Both The 
Circumstances 
The subjects were given the following instructions: 
If you think an individual is completely responsible 
for what happened, you would put a vertical slash mark 
through here (Experimenter points to the scale above 
"The Person"). If you think the individual has no 
responsibility for what happened, you would put your 
vertical slash mark here (Experimenter points to the 
scale above "The Circumstances"). By circumstances 
I mean anyone or anything else besides the individual 
himself. That includes other people, and the situations 
in which individuals find themselves. As you move 
along the scale to the left, you are assigning more 
and more responsibility to the individual. Here in 
the middle where it says "Both," this is the point 
where the individual and the circumstances share the 
responsibility evenly. To the right of this point 
the circumstances are more responsible than the 
individual. To the left of this point the individual 
is more responsible than the circumstances. You may 
put your vertical slash mark through any dot that 
you feel represents the proper assignment of 
responsibility in each story. 
The second rating scale was demonstrated on the blackboard by 
the following example: 
The Person should be ......... ? 
' ' ' ' ' oo,,o,,o,,,ooo,,,,,,,t1,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
Punished 
a lot 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
In explanatiQ_n of this scale, subjects were told that their next 
task was to decide what should be done to the individual for what 
happened, They were to place their slash mark at the place along 
the scale that indicated what they thought should be done to the 
person. The Experimenter then explained to the subjects how they 
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would mark the scale if they felt the individual should be punished 
"a little" or given a medium· reward." 
The third rating scale was represented by: 
The Person feels 
I I I I I 
......................................... 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
The subjects were told that the last question dealt with how they 
thought the individual felt about what happened. They were to place 
their slash mark at the place along the scale that they felt best 
described how the person felt. The experimenter then demonstrated 
how one would mark the scale if he felt the person felt "moderately 
bad" or "slightly good." 
The experimenter then told the subjects that the other part of 
the study involved 29 pair of statements. They were to choose which 
one of each pair they felt to be more true as far as their own 
experience was concerned. It was pointed out to them that they might 
not feel that either item was true, or that both items were true. In 
either case, they were to choose the one that they felt was the more 
true. 
Each subject's booklet contained 12 stories and the I-E scale. 
Half of the subjects, selected at random, received the story booklet 
first, and the remaining subjects received the I-E scale first. Half 
of the subjects in each of these groups randomly received the abstract 
stories, and the others received the situational stories. When the 
subjects were finished, they handed in their materials and left. The 
experimenter informed them that he would be coming into their classes 
to explain the purpose and results of the study. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Attribution of Responsibility 
The pattern of responsibility attribution across the levels of 
responsibility was affected by story method. This is reflected in the 
significant M x A interaction in Table 1, (F = 22.62, p<..001). The 
mean levels of attribution of responsibility as a function of story 
method and responsibility level are reported in Table II. Simple 
effects tests (Appendix E) performed on the M x A interaction 
indicated that story method made a difference on the attribution of 
responsibility at all levels of responsibility except purposive 
commission. Contextual stories led to a significantly larger 
attribution of personal responsibility than the abstract stories at 
global association (F = 101.60, p4'.001), careless commission 
(F = 5.95, p ..£..02), and selfish commission (F = 19.98, p .C:..001). 
Contextual stories led to less attribution of personal responsibility 
than the abstract stories at extended commission (F = 11. 09, p (. 001), 
and justified commission (F = 87 .68, p { .001). 
Reider's (1958) levels of responsibility were expected to lead to 
a greater attribution of personal responsibility as the levels 
increased from global association through purposive commission. The 
degree of personal responsibility was expected to drop between 
purposive commission and justified commission. This pattern has been 
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TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR 
ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY 
Source of Variation df MS 
Between Ss 
Story Method (M) 1 9..2. 7 5 
M x Ss w. groups 38 431.90 
Within Ss 
Story Level (A) 5 10379.87 
MxA 5 2659.88 
A x Ss w. groups 190 .. 117.15 
Outcome Intensity (B) 1 71.30 
M x B 1 123.02 
B x Ss w. groups 38 47 .20 
Ax B 5 135.53 
M x Ax B 5 58.56 
Ax B x Ss w. groups 190 39.89 
*.E. <. 01 
**:e. <. 001 
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F 
0.22 
88.61** 
22.62** 
1. 51 
2.61 
3.40* 
1.47 
Contextual 
Stories 
Abstract 
Stories 
Global 
Association 
19.05 
1.80 
TABLE II 
MEAN LEVEL OF RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTION AS A FUNCTION OF 
STORY METHOD AND RESPONSIBILITY LEVEL * 
Extended Careless Selfish Purposive 
Commission Commission Commission Commission 
4.90 29.50 33.50 35.60 
10.60 25.35 25. 90 37.65 
Justified 
Commission 
10.85 
26.85 
*The larger value indicates a greater attribution of personal responsibility 
w 
0 
31 
demonstrated before. The replication here was for the purpose of 
demonstrating that selfish commission would fit as a new level of 
responsibility between careless commission and purposive commission. 
Newman-Keuls (Weiner, 1971) tests (Appendix D) were performed on the 
means of responsibility attribution at the six levels of responsibility 
for both story methods. The abstract stories resulted in a theoretically 
patterned distribution of personal responsibility. With the exception 
of a non-significant increase in personal attribution of responsibility 
between careless commission and selfish commission, all other 
differences between levels were significant (p£.O~) and in the 
expected direction. The difference between careless commission and 
purposive commission was also significant (pL.05). So, conscious, 
but dismissed foresight - selfish commission - was not distinct as a 
level of responsibility from careless commission. 
With contextual stories there was a significant decrease in the 
attribution of responsibility between global association and extended 
commission (p'.05). This is in the opposite direction from the 
theoretical prediction and from past findings. The difference is also 
quite extreme. The increase in personal attribution of responsibility 
between extended commission and careless commission is significant 
(p-".05). The differences between careless commission and selfish 
commission, and between selfish commission and purposive commission 
were not significant. There was a significant decrease in the 
,1, 
._,,...,, 
attribution of personal responsibility between purposive commission 
and justified commission (p.c..05). Again, the addition of selfish 
commission as a distinct level of responsibility between careless 
,,., 
commission and purposive commission failed to be functional. With 
, 
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contextual stories, however, the difference in responsibility attribution 
between careless commission and purposive commission also failed to 
reach significance. 
The significant Ax B interaction reported in Table I indicated 
that responsibility level (A) was differentially affected by outcome 
intensity (B), (F = 3.397, pc.01). Severe negative outcomes were 
expected to lead to a greater attribution of personal responsibility 
than moderate negative outcomes at all levels of responsibility except 
global association and purposive commission. The mean levels of 
responsibility attribution as a function of outcome intensity and 
responsibility level are presented in Table III. Simple effects 
tests (Appendix E) performed on the interaction indicate that outcome 
intensity, as expected, made no difference at global association or 
purposive commission. Outcome intensity, however, also failed to 
produce a significant difference in the attribution of responsibility 
at careless commission and justified commission. The attribution of 
responsibility was affected by outcome intensity at extended commission 
(F = 7.38, p.C:...01) and selfish commission (F = 7.24, p -4,01). At 
selfish commission, the more severe the outcome, the more personal 
responsibility was attributed to the individual. At extended 
commission, however, the more severe negative outcome resulted in a 
lesser attribution of personal responsibility. This difference is in 
the opposite direction to the expected effect. 
Sanction Assignment 
Sanction assignment was also differentially affected by story 
method. The significant M x Ax B interaction (F = 10.37, p""-.001) 
Moderate 
Outcome 
Severe 
Outcome 
Global 
Association 
10.95 
9.90 
TABLE III 
MEAN LEVEL OF RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTION AS A 
FUNCTION OF NEGATIVE OUTCOME INTENSITY 
AND RESPONSIBILITY LEVEL* 
Extended Careless Selfish Purposive 
Commission Commission Commission Commission 
9.5 28.4 27 .8 36.5 
5.8 26.45 31. 6 26.75 
Justified 
Commission 
19.75 
17.95 
*The larger value indicates a greater attribution of personal responsibility. 
w 
w 
reported in Table IV indicates, however, that story method interacted 
jointly with both outcome intensity and responsibility level in the 
assignment of sanctions. The mean levels of sanction assignment as a 
function of story method, outcome intensity, and responsibility level 
are reported in Table V. These means are also graphed in Figure 1 
according to outcome intensity. 
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The three way interaction is due to the fact that sanction 
assignment differences between contextual and abstract stories, at a 
given level of responsibility, were differentially affected by outcome 
intensity. Simple effects tests (Appendix E) indicate where these 
differences occur. There were no significant sanctioning assignment 
differences between story methods at either outcome intensity with 
extended commission and purposive commission. At global association, 
contextual stories led to the assignment of more punishment than 
abstract stories. This difference was only significant for moderate 
intensity outcomes (F = 7.4, p<.01). At careless commission, contextual 
stories led to the assignment of less punishment than abstract stories. 
This difference was only significant with severe intensity outcomes 
(F = 9.5, p<.01). At selfish commission there was a direction 
difference in sanction assignment between story methods as a function 
of outcome intensity. Contextual stories resulted in significantly 
less punishment assignment than abstract stories (when outcomes were 
moderate in intensity, (F·~ 13.8, p~.001). With severe outcome 
intensity, contextual stories resulted in more punishment assignment 
than abstract stories (F = 9.02, p ~.01). Justified commission resulted 
in less punishment assignment with contextual stories at both outcome 
intensities. This difference was only significant, however, with severe 
outcome intensity (F = 71.37, p.C:.001). 
TABLE IV 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR 
SANCTIONS ASSIGNMENT 
Source of Variation df MS 
Between Ss 
' -Story Method (M) 1 235.20 
M x Ss w. groups 38 64.64 
Within Ss 
Story Level (A) 5 2164.63 
MxA 5 169.56 
A x Ss w. groups 190 25.23 
Outcome Intensity (B) 1 750.00 
M x B 1 3.33 
Bx Ss w. groups 38 16.08 
A x B 5 287.31 
M x Ax B 5 161. 73 
Ax B x Ss w. groups 190 15.60 
*£ ~ .001 
35 
F 
3.64 
85.81* 
6. 72* 
46.63* 
0.21 
18.42 
10.37* 
Moderate 
Outcome 
Contextual 
Stories Severe 
Outcome 
Moderate 
Outcome 
Abstract 
Stories Severe 
Outcome 
Global 
TABLE V 
MEAN LEVEL OF SANCTION ASSIGNMENT AS A FUNCTION 
OF STORY METHOD, STORY OUTCOME, 
AND RESPONSIBILITY LEVEL* 
Extended Careless Selfish Purposive 
Association Commission Commission Commission Commission 
21.90 19.30 21.30 19.60 29.60 
21.00 19.50 21.40 31.50 37.70 
18.50 20.50 22.00 24.20 31.80 
19.20 20.80 25.30 27.80 37.00 
*The larger value indicates the assignment of more negative sanctions. 
Justified 
Commission 
24.20 
18.60 
25.80 
29.20 
w 
0\ 
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Outcome intensity was expected to affect the assignment of sanctions 
at all levels of responsibility except ~lobal ass9ciation and purposive 
commission. The significant M x Ax B interaction (F = 10.37, p""'.001) 
reported in Table IV qualifies the interpretation of the effect of 
outcome intensity on sanction assignment. There are story method 
differences in the effect of outcome intensity on sanction assignment 
across the levels of responsibility. The mean levels of sanction 
assignment as a function of story method, outcome intensity, and 
responsibility level are reported in Table V. These means are also 
graphed in Figure 2 according to story method. 
Simple effects tests (Appendix E) indicate that there were no 
significant sanctioning assignment differences between outcome 
intensities with either story method at global association or extended 
commission. The differential effect of story method on the relationship 
between outcome intensity and responsibility level was due to differ-
ences at the remaining levels. of responsibility. At careless commission, 
severe outcome intensities led to more punishment assignment than 
moderate outcome intensities. This difference was only significant 
.for abstract stories (F = 6.98, p.t..01). Severe outcome intensities 
also resulted in more punishment assignment than moderate outcome 
intensi.ties with selfish commission. This difference was significant 
for both story methods a1though. it was larger for contextual stories 
(F = 96.3, p<.001) than for abstract stories (F = 8.31, p L,01). At 
purposive commission, severe outcomes fed to morepunishment assignment 
than moderate outcomes with both story methods. This difference-was 
significant for both methods, but larger for contextual stories 
(F = 43.12, p<-.001) than for the abstract stories. With justified 
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commission there was a direction difference in sanction assignment 
between outcome intensities as a function of story method. With 
contextual stories, severe outcome intensities led to the assignment 
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of less punishment (F = 19.71, p..::..001) than moderate outcome intensities. 
With abstract stories, severe outcome intensities led to more punishment 
assignment than the moderate intensities (F = 7.4, p<.01). 
Reider's (1958) levels of responsibility were expected to lead to 
greater punishment assignment as the levels increased from global 
association through purposive commission. The degree of punishment 
assignment was expected to drop between purposive commission and 
justified commission. This pattern has been demonstrated before. The 
replication here was for the purpose of demonstrating that selfish 
commission would fit as a distinct level of responsibility that affected 
sanctioning. Selfish commission was expected to lead to more punishment 
assignment than careless commission, but less than purposive commission. 
Newman-Keuls tests (Appendix D) were performed on the means of 
sanction assignment for both story methods. 
With abstract stories, the only significant progressive differences 
in sanction assignment were between selfish commission and purposive 
commission, and between purposive commission and justified commission 
(p ~. 05). Purposive commission resulted in the greatest punishment 
assignment and differed from every other level of responsibility in 
degree of sanctioning (p<.05). Selfish commission also differed 
from every other level in sanctioning assignment (p <::..,05). There were 
no other significant differences. 
With contextual stories selfish commission and purposive commission 
differed significantly (p< .05) from each other and all other levels. 
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There were no other significant differences. So with contextual 
stories, selfish commission resulted in different degree of sanction 
assignment than careless commission or purposive commission. An 
orthogonal comparison between careless commission and selfish commission 
which failed to attain significance with respect to the attribution 
of responsibility, (F. = 1.79) was significant with sanction assignment 
(F = 17.004, p<.001). Selfish commission resulted in more punishment 
assignment. This provides some evidence for its distinctiveness as 
a level of responsibility. 
The Attribution of Emotion 
As with responsibility attribution, and the assignment of sanctions, 
emotional attribution was also affected by story method. The significant 
M x Ax B interaction (F = 2.83, p <.05) reported in Table VI 
indicates that, like sanction assignment, story method interacted 
with both outcome intensity and responsibility level in the attribution 
of emotions. The mean levels of emotional attribution as a function 
of story method, story outcome, and responsibility level are reported 
in Table VII. These means are also graphed in Figure 3 according to 
outcome intensity. Simple effects tests (Appendix E) indicate where 
these differences occur. With the exception of purposive commission 
with moderate outcomes, the mean level of emotional attribution was 
always lower for abstract stories, indicating more negative emotional 
attributions. Story method made no difference at extended commission 
or purposive commission with either outcome level. Story method did 
make a significant difference for both moderate and severe outcome 
levels at global association (F = 31.9, p <.001; F = 20.7, p~.001, 
Source of Variation 
Between Ss 
Story Method (M) 
M x Ss w. groups 
Within Ss 
Story Level (A) 
MxA 
A x Ss w. groups 
Outcome Intensity 
M x B 
B x Ss w. groups 
A x B 
Mx A x B 
TABLE VI 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
FOR ATTRIBUTION OF EMOTION 
df MS 
1 2895.92 
38 147.43 
5 1649.67 
5 150.66 
190 50.08 
(B) 1 808.60 
1 40.25 
38 41.56 
5 299.94 
5 88.21 
Ax B x Ss w. groups 190 31.26 
*.E. .t:.. 05 
**.E.-'. 01 
***.E. ~ . 001 
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F 
19.64*** 
32.94*** 
3.01** 
19.46** 
0.97 
9.60*** 
2.83* 
Moderate 
Outcome 
Contextual 
Stories Severe 
Outcome 
Moderate 
Outcome 
Abstract 
Stories Severe 
Outcome 
TABLE VII 
MEAN LEVEL OF ATTRIBUTION OF EMOTION 
AS A FUNCTION OF STORY METHOD, STORY 
OUTCOME, AND RESPONSIBILITY LEVEL* 
Global 
Association 
Extended 
Commission 
Careless 
Commission 
Selfish 
Commission 
34.9 28.2 31.6 24.3 
33.3 32.7 37.4 36.4 
24.9 25.2 27.5 23.0 
25.2 29.0 32.1 27.6 
Purposive 
Commission 
18.9 
19.9 
19.9 
16.9 
*The larger value indicates the attribution of more negative emotions. 
Justified 
Commission 
30.7 
28.0 
22.0 
23.8 
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respectively), careless commission (F = 5.3, p<.05; F = 8.8, p..C..01, 
respectively), and justified commission (F = 24.2, p~.001; F = 5.8, 
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p <. 05, respectively). At extended commission and selfish commission 
there were no differences in emotional attribution for story method 
with moderate outcomes. However, with severe outcomes, story method 
did make a significant difference at both extended commission (F = 4.4, 
p 4,05) and selfish commission (F = 24.5, pL.001). In both cases 
less negative emotions were attributed with the contextual stories. 
These were the major factors in obtaining the significant three way 
interaction. 
Individuals were expected to attribute increasingly more negative 
emotions to individuals as the level of responsibility increased from 
global association through careless commission. Less negative affect 
was expected to be attributed to individuals at selfish, purposive, 
and justified commission than at the other levels. Purposive commission 
was expected to receive the least negative-attributionof emotion. 
Newman-Keuls tests (Appendix D) were performed on the means of 
emotional attributions for both story methods. 
With abstract stories, purposive commission differed significantly 
(pC:.05) from all the other levels except justified commission. In all 
cases purposive commission led to a more negative attribution of 
emotion and did result in the least negative attribution of emotion. 
The only other significant difference was between careless commission 
and justified commission (p.::::~05). So, while the means were in the 
expected direction with the abstract stories, the expected progressive 
differences in the attribution of emotion across the levels of 
responsibility were not significant, with the exception of selfish 
versus purposive commission. 
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With the contextual stories the mean levels of attribution of 
emotion did not follow the expected pattern although purposive commission 
did receive the least negative attributions of emotion as expected. The 
results of a Newman-Keuls test performed on this data (Appendix D) 
indicated that purposive commission differed significantly from every 
other level (p<::. 05). Careless commission also differed from justified 
commission (p<:..05). Again, with the exception of the significant step 
between selfish and purposive commission, and the difference between 
purposive and justified commission, the expected progressive differences 
in the attribution of emotion across responsibility levels failed to 
materialize. An orthogonal comparison between careless commission and 
selfish commission with respect to the attribution of emotioQ was 
significant (F = 14.94, p<';..001). Selfish commission resulted in the 
attribution of less negative feelings than careless commission. This 
is further support for the proposition that these are two distinct 
levels of responsibility. 
Outcome intensity was also expected to affect the attribution of 
emotion; Severe negative outcomes were expected to lead to the 
attribution of more negative emotions than moderate negative outcomes 
at global association, extended commission, and careless commission. 
Decreased negative attributions of emotion were expected at selfish, 
purposive, and justified commission. The significant M x Ax B 
interaction reported in Table VI qualifies the interpretation of outcome 
intensity on emotional attribution. There are story method differences 
in the effect of outcome intensity on emotional attribution across the 
levels of responsibility. The mean levels of emotional attribution as 
a function of story method, outcome intensity, and responsibility 
level are reported in Table VII. These means are also graphed in 
Figure 4 according to story method. 
Simple effects tests (Appendix E) performed on this interaction 
indicate that outcome intensity affected the attribution of emotion 
for both contextual and.abstract stories at only extended commission 
(F = 6.5, p <. .05; F = 4.5, p.:::: .05, respectively), careless commission 
(F 10.8, p<.01; F = 6.8, p<.01, respectively), and selfish 
commission (F = 46.5, p<.001; F = 6.9, p< .01,' respectively). In all 
cases, more moderate outcomes led to attributions of more negative 
emotions than did the severe outcomes. The three way interaction, 
here, appears to be due to the fact that the differences between the 
moderate and severe outcomes were·more pronounced with the contextual 
steries. 
Locus of Control 
Within each story method subjects were divided by means of a 
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median split into either "internals" or "externals" with respect to 
their perception of the locus. of control. With the contextual stories 
the median was a score of 11 and the·range was from 3 to 21. With 
abstract stories the median was 11.5 and the range was from 7 to 17. 
Analyses of variance ~'er"e performed on the attribution of responsibility, 
sanction assignment, and the attribution of emotion for internals 
versus externals within each method of story presentation. The results 
reported in Appendix F indicate that an individual's perceived locus 
of control had no significant effect on his attribution of responsibility, 
assignment of .sanctions, or his attribution of emotion. 
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Dependent Variable Correlations 
Pearson Product Moment correlations were performed between the 
three dependent variables of responsibility attribution, sanction 
assignment, and the attribution of emotion. The correlation between 
responsibility attribution and sanction assignment was .361. This is 
significantly different from zero at the .05 level (df = 38). The 
correlation between the attribution of responsibility and the 
attribution of emotion was .111, not significantly different from 
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zero. Sanction assignment and the attribution of emotion also resulted 
in a non-significant correlation of .084. 
With responsibility attribution and sanction assignment there was 
a non-significant correlation of .252 when the story outcome intensity 
was moderate. With a severe negative outcome, the correlation between 
the attribution of responsibility and sanction assignment was .462. 
This is significant at the .01 level. 
Results of correlations between the dependent variables at each 
level of responsibility and for each story method are reported in 
Appendix G. In general, the correlations are higher, though non-
significant, with abstract stories than with contextual stories. 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
The Attribution of Responsibility 
The attribution of responsibility was affected by story method. 
Contextual and abstract stories resulted in different patterns of 
responsibility attribution across levels of responsibility, and in 
different degrees of attribution of responsibility within levels. 
With the exception of a non-significant increase between careless 
commission and selfish commission, the abstract stories resulted in a 
theoretically perfect pattern of attribution of responsibility. The 
least attribution of personal responsibility occurred with global 
association. The degree of personal responsibility increased 
significantly at every level, with the exception of selfish commission 
as mentioned, througp purposive commission and decreased significantly 
at justified commission. Contextual stories did not· result in this 
expected pattern of responsibility attribution. The general pattern 
is present but there are two significant deviations. First, there is 
a significant decrease in the attribution of personal responsibility 
between global association and extended commission. Second, there is 
no significant increase in the attribution of responsibility between 
either careless or selfish commission and purposive commission. 
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The discrepancy in the pattern of responsibility attribution 
between contextual and abstract stories may be due to the possibility 
that the subjects may have been able to identify more with the stories 
that involved a "real world" situation, that is, the contextual stories. 
The abstract stories present a less concrete situation and thus offer 
the subject little with which to identify. The· contextual stories, 
though indicated by pretesting to represent the desired level of 
responsibility, may have resulted in atheoretical attributions of 
responsibility because of the particulars of the situation offered 
in the story. With abstract stories there is no question as to the 
presence or absence of the relevant factors since they are presented 
forthright with no. other extraneous information. They offer no 
situational particulars to alter the perception of personal responsi-
bility. With contextual stories the factors of foresight, consideration, 
intention, or justification may be weighed against the particular 
aspects of the situation in the attribution of responsibility. This 
makes the attribution of responsibility a more complicated process 
than the present theories are equipped to handle. Thus the surprisingly 
high personal responsibility level attributed at global association 
with the contextual stories may be due to the particulars of the 
situations presented by the story. Likewise, the pretested extended 
commission stories may have resulted in a lower than anticipated 
attribution of personal responsibility because of situational 
particulars. The lack of an increase in the attribution of personal 
responsibility between careless or selfish commission and purposive 
commission indicates that once foresight was possible the addition 
of intent made no difference. This is at variance with expectations 
and past findings. 
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There were also story method differences in the degree of 
responsibility attribution at every level of responsibility except 
purposive commission. Contextual stories resulted in a greater 
attribution of personal responsibility at global association, careless 
commission, and selfish commission. Abstract stories produced greater 
attribution of personal responsibility at extended commission and 
justified commission. 
With careless, selfish, and justified commission it is possible 
that the contextual stories, with their real world examples allowed 
the subject to project himself into a similar situation. He is then 
able to conceive of these things happening by him or to him. This 
greater identification with the situation may cause him to judge 
individuals more harshly for their associations (global association) 
and acts of negligence (careless and selfish commission), but less 
harshly when there are mitigating circumstances (justified commission). 
This identification with the situation may also lead to the smaller 
attribution of personal responsibility with extended commission. 
According to Shaver's (1970b) defensive attribution theory, when 
the individual perceives himself as similar to the perpetrator of an 
act, and the situation is one that he might encounter unexpectedly, 
there may be no way that the individual can keep from admitting to 
himself that such a thing could happen to him. He therefore 
attributes all due caution (foresight) to the individual, and decides 
that the occurrence is due to chance. This explanation appears to 
apply to the extended commission situation where there was no way 
the individual could have foreseen .the unexpected outcome that his 
behavior produced. 
Outcome intensity was expected to affect the attribution of 
responsibility at all levels of responsibility except global 
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association and purposive commission. As outcome intensity increased, 
more attribution of personal responsibility was expected. With global 
association and purposive commission there should be less doubt as to 
the extent of an individual's culpability. He has little responsibility 
with global association, and maximum responsibility with purposive 
commission. At these levels the intensity of an outcome should not 
affect the attribution of responsibility. When you are guilty, you're 
guilty, and when you're not, you're not! At all the other levels of 
responsibility there is more ambiguity as to the extent of personal 
responsibility. Here outcome intensity was expected to affect 
responsibility attribution. The results indicated that outcome 
intensity did not affect the attribution of responsibility at either 
global association or purposive commission. Outcome intensity, 
however, also failed to affect responsibility attribution at careless 
commission and justified commission. The only levels of responsibility 
where attribution of responsibility was affected by outcome intensity 
were extended commission and selfish commission. It appears that with 
lack of foresight (careless commission), or with mitigating circumstances 
(justified commission) outcome intensity does not affect the attri-
bution of responsibility. Where there is conscious consideration 
of possible outcomes (selfish commission), and the individual's 
behavior results in the foreseen but unintended outcome, the more 
severe the outcome, the more the individual is held to be personally 
responsible for that outcome. 
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At extended commission, more severe negative outcomes led to 
less attribution of personal responsibility than moderate outcomes. 
This is the opposite of what was expected. Again this can be explained 
by defensive attribution theory. Extended commission is a level of 
responsibility where the outcome is unforeseeable. When the individual 
conceives that a similar situation could happen to him, regardless of 
all caution, he attributes the responsibility for the outcome to 
non-personal factors. As the outcome increases in its undesirability 
he should feel more need to attribute the responsibility to factors 
other than himself. If this were the case, then one would expect 
that contextual stories should enhance this phenomenon since they 
produce more identification with the situation than the abstract 
stories. An inspection of the mean levels of responsibility attribution 
at extended commission for moderate and severe outcomes for both story 
methods supports this proposition. With abstract stories there was 
an average decrease of attribution of personal responsibility of 1.8 
units (11.5 to 9. 7) from moderate outcomes to severe outcomes. The 
average decrease for contextual stories was more than three times,as 
large, 6.0 units (7.9 to 1.9) between moderate and severe outcomes. 
It appears that outcome intensity only affects the attribution of 
responsibility at some levels of responsibility but not others. 
Sanction Assignment 
Story method also affected sanction assignment. This effect 
was modified, however, by the effect of the intensity of the outcome. 
In general, contextual stories led to the assignment of less negative 
sanctions. This is in line with what would be-expected with the 
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subject's easier ability to identify with the situations presented in 
the contextual stories. Feeling these situations could happen to him, 
he is less likely to assign severe punishments for the action. There 
are two exceptions to this. First, with severe-outcomes subjects 
assigned more severe sanctions with·contextual stories than with 
abstract stories at selfish commission. This result is consistent 
·with the findings on responsibility attribution where the contextual 
stories resulted in a greater attribution of personal responsibility 
at selfish commission. The subjects appeared to be intolerant of 
negligence. The selfish commission situation presents them with the 
information that the subject was aware of the possible unintended 
outcome of his action. So he did have the opportunity to avoid the 
outcome. The subject therefore cannot attribute all due caution to 
the actor and thus cannot attribute the action to non-personal 
factors. Therefore the actor is held more personally responsible 
for the outcome at severe-outcomes, and is punished more harshly. 
The other exception is that at global association, contextual 
stories also. led to more negat'ive sanction assignment than the 
· abstract stories. This same directional result is present with 
severe outcomes but is not significant. This finding is also consistent 
with the findings.on responsibility attribution. At global association, 
contextual stories resulted in a larger attribution of personal 
responsibility than the abstract situations. The greater identification 
with the contextual stories apparently causes the subject to judge 
individuals more harshly for their associations. The more responsible 
the individual is, the more he should be sanctioned. 
Outcome intensity was expected to affect sanction assignment 
at all the levels of responsibility except global association and 
purposive commission. Since no difference in personal responsibility 
as a function of outcome intensity was expected at these levels, no 
differences in sanction assignment with outcome intensity were 
expected. In all other cases a more severe outcome was expected to 
result in more negative sanctions. The-effect of outcome intensity 
on sanction assignment across the levels of responsibility was also 
affected by story method. In general, themoresevere outcomes led 
to greater sanction assignment. As expected, however, outcome 
intensity did not affect sanction assignment at global association 
with either method. More intense outcomes did, however, affect the 
assignment of sanctions at purposive commission with both methods. 
So although outcome intensity did not affect the attribution of 
responsibility at purposive commission, it did affect the sanctions 
that one,assigned for an action. Outcome intensity failed to affect 
the assignment of sanctions at extended commission with both methods, 
and at careless commission with·. contextual stories. With extended 
commission allowing no possible foresight, individuals attributed 
respansibility for the outcome to non-personal factors. Since 
responsibility did no; lie primarily in the actor, the intensity of 
the outcome.should not affect the assignment of sanctions to him. 
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This same,explanation holds for the lack of outcome effect on careless 
commission with.contextual stories. Abstract stories do not produce 
this identification with the situation and so outcome intensity does 
lead to more negative san'c:tioning at careless commission although, it 
did not result in more personal responsibility. 
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More negative sanctions were handed out for severe outcomes than 
for moderate outcomes at the selfish.commission level. This difference, 
as expected with an identification explanation, was more pronounced 
with contextual stories as subjects could attribute-conscious foresight 
to the individual, and thus hold him more responsible and deserving 
.of more sanctioning when the effect of his actions was more intense. 
At justified commission there was a direction difference in 
the effect of outcome intensity as a function of story method. Again, 
as expected from the identification hypothesis, therewas less sanc-
tioning assigned to the individuals for severe outcomes with contextual 
stories at justified commission. With abstract stories, with less 
chance for identification with the situation on the subjects' part, 
more negative sanctions were assigned for severe outcomes than for 
moderate out.comes. 
Sanction.assignment was expected to follow the same pattern as 
responsibility attribution. As more responsibility was assigned to 
the-individual for the action, the more negative sanctions were 
expected to be assigned to him. Negative sanctions were expected 
to be the least at global association where the individual should be 
attributed least responsibility. Negative sanction assignment should 
then progressively increase through purposive commission and then 
decrease at justified commission. This expected pattern-of sanction 
assignment across the levels of responsibility was only partially 
supported. With abstract stories, there were no progressive 
differences in sanction assignment between global association, extended 
commissian, careless commission and s.elfish commission. Selfish 
commission did produce less negative sanctioning than purposive 
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commission, which in turn resulted in more negative sanctioning than 
justified commission. So the expected pattern of sanctioning appeared 
at only the three.highest levels of responsibility. 
With contextual stories the-expected pattern of sanction assignment 
. across the levels of responsibility was even less apparent. There was 
a significant increase in negative sanction assignment between careless 
and selfish commission, partially supporting the-prediction of these 
two levels as distinct. Therewas.also a significant increase in 
negative-sanction assignment between selfish commission and purposive 
commission. There-were no other .significant differences between the 
levels. 
It appears that sanctioning behavior is not as affected by the 
levels of responsibility at which the action accurs as was at first 
thought. Sanctianing appears to be due to other factors. Increases 
in sanctioning assignment do not appear until the level of responsibility 
where there is a conscious consideration of the possible outcomes. 
Once this consideration takes place, sanctioning can be affected by 
intent and sometimes justification. It is interesting ta note that 
with.the-contextual stories, where the individual can identify more 
easily with the.happening, there is no decrease in the level of 
negative sanctioning between purposive and justified commission. 
This occurs. even though the individual is seen as less personally 
responsible for the-actionat justified-commission than at-purposive 
cammission. Thus it appears that while sanctioning assignment and 
the attribution of responsibility are related, the relationship is 
not as close as it would at first seem. 
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The Attribution of Emotion 
Subjects were expected to assign negative affective states to those 
individuals who were involved with a negative outcome at global 
association, extended commission, and careless commission. The least 
negative affect was expected to be attributed at global association, 
and the most at careless commission. Subjects were expected to 
attribute less negative emotions to individuals involved in selfish, 
purposive, and justified commission, with purposive commission 
receiving the least negative attribution of emotion. 
The degree of attribution of emotion for the levels of 
responsibility was also affected by story method. Like sanction 
assignment, however, this effect was modified by the intensity of the 
outcome. In general, contextual stories led to attributions of more 
negative emotions than dld the abstract stories. In no case did an 
abstract story result in the attribution of more negative emotions 
than the corresponding contextual story. The three way interaction 
was due to the fact that the differences in emotional attribution, 
as a function of story method, were more widespread with severe 
outcomes. At purposive commission, story method made no difference 
regardless of outcome level. In all cases the individual perpetrating 
an intentional act was seen as feeling rather "indifferent" about it. 
With severe outcomes, ali levels of responsibility except purposive 
commission resulted in significantly larger attributions of negative 
emotion with the-contextual stories. This can again be explained by 
the greater potential for identification with the contextual stories 
over the abstract stories. When one can project himself into the 
situation, he should be more likely to attribute negative affect to 
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the actor for the unpleasant outcomes since he knows that he, himself, 
would certainly feel baa if he were involved. With moderate outcomes, 
besides no difference at purposive commission, there were also no 
differences due to story method at either extended commission or 
selfish commission. When there was no possible foresight (extended 
commission) and only a slightly bad outcome, more identification with 
the story did not lead to attributions of more negative emotions. 
Likewise with selfish commission, identification with the contextual 
stories did not lead to attributions of more negative emotions with 
moderate outcomes. Evidently an individual who acts selfishly is not 
attributed negative emotions for his selfishness unless the outcome 
is serious, and is one which readily lends itself to identification. 
The attribution of emotion was expected to be affected by the 
intensity of the outcome. More intense emotions were expected to be 
attributed as outcomes increased in severity at global association, 
extended commission, and careless commission. Selfish, purposive, 
and justified commission were expected to result in less negative 
affect as outcomes increased in intensity. The·effect of outcome 
intensity of the attribution of emotion was differentially affected 
by story method. Regardless of story method, outcome intensity only 
affected attributions of emotion at extended commission, careless 
commission, and selfish commission. Thus the·predictions were only 
partially supported. In all cases severe outcomes led to the 
·attribution of more negative emotions. With contextual stories, the 
significant differences between moderate and severe outcomes were 
more pronounced with contextual stories than with the abstract 
stories. Again the greater potential for identification with the 
contextual stories led to attributions of more negative feelings for 
the resultant effects of the situation. 
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Evidently outcome intensity affects the attribution of emotion 
only for actions occurring without intent, whether or not those 
intended actions are justified. With intent, justification, or for 
mere association with the outcome (global association) more severe 
outcomes do not lead to attributions of more negative emotions. The 
increase in the attribution of negative affect with increased intensity 
of outcome at selfish commission was the opposite of what was predicted. 
There were few significant progressive differences in the 
attribution of emotion between the levels of responsibility. With 
contextual stories, purposive commission did result in the lowest 
attribution of negative affect. Actors at this level were rated as 
feeling indifferent about their intended negative outcome. They were 
attributed less negative emotion than actors at either selfish or 
justified commission" With abstract stories the only significant 
progressive difference in the attribution of emotion between levels 
of responsibility was a decrease from selfish to purposive commission. 
So, like sanction assignment, the attribution of emotion was not as 
affected by the levels of responsibility as was originally thought. 
Individuals were attributed moderately negative emotions for their 
negative behavioral outcomes at all levels of responsibility except 
purposive commission. At purposive commission they were attributed 
indifference for their actions. Apparently subjects decided that 
an individual would not perform an intentional negative act if he 
expected to feel bad about it. Even when the action was justified 
individuals were attributed negative emotions. Perhaps the subjects 
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attributed the actor the feeling "this will hurt me more than it does 
-you" as he performed his action on the target. So even when the 
environment shares the responsibility, the individual is still 
perceived as feeling "bad" about what he caused. 
Foresight 
Reider's (1958) third level has been called foreseeablecommission. 
Heider defined this level as one where an individual is held responsible 
for any aftereffect of his behavior that he might have foreseen, that 
the individual was not deterred from the pursuit of his goal by the 
thought of harm to another. The present investigation proposed that 
there were two distinct levels of responsibility proposed in Reider's 
third level. One level was called careless commission. This is where 
there was no conscious foresight of the possible aftereffect. The 
second level was called selfish commission. This is where an 
individual consciously considers the possible alternative outcomes or 
byproducts of his action, but dismisses them and acts anyway. There 
is an absence of intent with both of these levels. Selfish commission, 
however, represents a more inconsiderate or ruthless behavior. It 
appears, therefore, that a consideration of the consciousness of 
foresight could be an important and necessary theoretical distinction 
in levels of responsibility. One should expect an individual who 
. was aware his behavior might result in an unintended negative outcome 
to be held more responsible for that outcome, be sanctioned more, and 
be attributed less negative affective feelings for his behavior than 
the individual who merely failed to demonstrate appropriate vigilance. 
The data indicate that careless and selfish commission may indeed be 
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distinct levels of responsibility. With the attribution of responsibility, 
there was no difference between the two levels with respect to the 
extent of responsibility attribution. However, other differences did 
emerge. Outcome intensity failed to affect careless commission 
stories but led to a significant increase in personal responsibility 
with increased outcome intensity at selfish commission. With sanction 
assignment, selfish commission did result in more negative sanction 
assignment than careless commission with contextual stories. An 
orthogonal comparison between careless and selfish commission with 
respect to the attribution of emotion resulted in significantly less 
,attribution of negative affect to the actor with selfish commission. 
These results seem to indicate that conscious consideration of 
foresight, as compared to no consideration, does not affect the 
attribution of responsibility unless the outcome is severe. Regardless 
of outcome severity, however, there is a tendency to assign more 
negative sanctions and attribute less negative affect to the individual 
when he has consciously considered the possible unintended outcomes 
.of his actions. 
Locus of Control 
An individual's orientation toward the locus of control of 
behavior did not affect the manner in which he attributed responsibility, 
assigned sanctions, or attributed emotional states to another person. 
This result is in direct contrad.iction to Phares and Wilson (1972) who 
found that internals attributed more responsibility than externals. 
The stimuli used by Phares and Wilson to elicit responsibility 
attribution were scenarios of traffic accidents. These involve a 
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legal determination of responsibility. This is possibly different 
from-a non-legal determination of responsibility. Perhaps individuals 
with internal and external orientations toward the locus of control 
of behavior respond diff~rently in determining a legal question of 
guilt. The present study attempted to avoid legal type issues to 
avoid the possibility of a biasing effect. The stories used by 
Phares and Wilson also presented the subject with more information 
than did the-stories in the present study. Perhaps internals and 
externals don't differ in their attributions of responsibility until 
a certain degree of background information is available, greater than 
that provided by the· contextual stories in the -- present study. 
Dependent Variable Correlations 
Correlations between the dependent variables revealed them to be 
fairly independent of one another and thus worthy of separate 
investigation. The only significant correlation was between the 
attribution of responsibility and sanction assignment. While 
significant, this correlation (.361) tells us that just 13% of the 
variance in each of these processes can be accounted for by knowlelilge 
of the other. So while they are related, they do have considerable 
independence-as processes. 
The data would indicate that there is.a relationship between the 
extent of an -individual's responsibility and the degree of sanctioning 
he-is assigned. However, responsibility is attributed, and sanctions 
are assigned, regardless of perceptions of the actor's feelings about 
what he has done. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study indicate several things with respect 
to the study of the attribution of responsibility, Foremost is that 
investigators must take more care in the development of the stimuli 
they use to elicit the attribution response. More care must be taken 
to insure that the variables of interest are indeed present in the 
eliciting stimuli. 
Much work remains to be done in the determination of the factors 
that affect responsibility attribution. The specifics of the 
situation and the subject's perception of relevant factors must be 
investigated further. The pilot work for this study demonstrated 
the difficulty of creating situations which resulted in uniform 
perceptions of the variables of interest. Subjects differed 
considerably in what they perceived as foreseeable or justified. 
The different pattern of responsibility attribution with contextual 
stories as compared to the abstract stories indicates that the 
particulars of the situation used in the,example may interact with 
the variables of interest in determining the extent of an individual's 
responsibility. The additional information provided the subject, 
perhaps in his ability to identify with the situation, is affecting 
the attribution. These factors need to be investigated. 
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One can isolate the present theoretical factors and see their 
effect on responsibility attribution by using the abstract stories. 
This reduces the chance for differential perceptions of the situation, 
and the effect of situational particulars that may be involved when 
contextual style stories are used. However, while allowing more 
access to the theoretical factors, the abstract stories may result 
in an unrealistic pattern of responsibility attribution. The results 
of this study indicated that these theoretical factors can interact 
with more information about situational particulars to produce 
different patterns of responsibility. Since our attributions rarely 
occur in the abstract, the effect of these other variables on the 
present theoretical variables must be identified. 
The intensity of an outcome does not always affect the attribution 
. 
of responsibility. When it does, a more severe outcome does not always 
result in an increased attribution of responsibility. When the 
outcome is bad and totally unforeseeable, individual's hold others 
less responsible for the outcome if they can identify with that other. 
Only when the actor had foresight of what might happen but acted 
unintentionally did a more severe outcome lead to a greater attribution 
of personal responsibility. 
Sanction assignment is related to the attribution of responsibility, 
but is not as affected by the levels of responsibility. Sanctioning 
-
appears to be more severe once conscious consideration of possible 
outcomes takes place. Sanctioning assignment is also more affected by 
outcome intensity than is the attribution of responsibility. More 
intense outcomes led to more sanction assignment once foresight was 
possible, but to less sanctions when the act was justified. 
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The attribution of emotion also appears to be independent of the 
levels qf responsibility. In general, individuals are attributed 
negative emotions for negative behavioral outcomes. When the 
individual purposely caused a negative outcome, however, he was seen 
as feeling indifferent about what he had done. Outcome intensity 
affects the attribution of emotion only in those situations where 
intent was not present. 
Whether or not attributors think the individual had consciously 
considered a foreseeable outcome affects their reactions to him. 
While they do not in general hold him more responsible, they do 
bald him· so when the result of his action is sev;erely negative. If 
an individual consciously considers a foreseeable outcome, and this 
outcome occurs unintentionally, the individual is seen as feeling less 
negative about what he did, and is assigned more punishment than i;f 
he did not consciously consider the possible outcomes. Therefore, 
there sufficient evidence to warrant the separation of what was 
previously foreseeable ~mmission into careless and selfish commission 
in order to investigate the effects of foreseeable outcomes. 
An understanding of responsibility attribution, sanction assignment 
and emotional attribution appears to be a worthy field of study for 
psychology. These processes affect our day to day interactions, and 
reach their culmination of specific importance in a legal trial. A 
better understanding of the factors affecting these processes could 
be most important. 
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AGREEMENT PERCENTAGES FOR CONTEXTUAL STORIES 
Stors1 Level 
~-
Story Outcome 
N Agreement N Agreement 
Global Association 
Moderate Outcome 17 82.4% 17 100.0% 
Severe Outcome 18 94.4% 18 94.4% 
Extended Commission 
Moderate Outcome 19 73.0% 18 94.4% 
Severe Outcome 19 73.0% 19 100.0% 
Careless Commission 
Moderate Outcome 18 77. 7% 18 100. 0% 
Severe Outcome 18 77. 7% 18 77.7% 
Foreseeable Commission 
Moderate Outcome 18 100.0% 14 72.2% 
Severe Outcome 18 100.0% 18 77. 7% 
Purposive Commission 
Moderate Outcome 18 88.8% 18 94.4% 
Severe Outcome 18 100.0% 18 100.0% 
Justified Commission 
Moderate Outcome 18 77. 7% 18 94.4% 
Severe Outcome 18 72.2% 18 83.3% 
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KEY SHEET FOR CONTEXTUAL STORIES 
Principal Level Outcome 
Charles Purposive Moderate 
Judy Careless Severe 
Brenda Selfish Moderate 
Jean Extended Moderate 
Bob Justified Severe 
Rick Purposive Severe 
Ray Careless Moderate 
Peggy Global Moderate 
Phil Extended Severe 
Margareta Selfish Severe 
Harvey Global Severe 
Lisa Justified Moderate 
Charles deliberately picked up one of his brother's empty soft drink 
bottles and threw it against the sidewalk where it shattered. 
Who is responsible for the shattered soft drink bottle? 
I I I I I 
ooeo•o•o•oooeeo•••••o•o•••••o•••••••••••• 
Both 
Charles should be 
The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 
oooooooooeoeoe•••••o•o••••••••••••••••••• 
Punished 
a lot 
Charles feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I I I I I OQOOO•••••o••···········•o••············· 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
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Judy finished shaving her legs and without thinking left the razorblade 
on the side of the bathtub. Her two-year old daughter walked into the 
·b~throom, licked up the razorblade and cut herself very badly. She 
severed a tendon and lost the use of her index finger. 
Who is responsible for the little girl's severed tendon? 
I I I I I 
<IO GOO 00000 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O ltO O 00 0 O O O 000 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 
Judy 
Judy should be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 
oooooooooooooooonooooooo,000,0,00,000000, 
Pi:.l);l.ished 
a lot 
Judy feels 
· Nothing ·• 
should be done 
- I 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I I I I I 
0000000 ooo o ••.••• aeo, 000000 a 111,, •• o ••, o•••• 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
76 
Brenda hadn't finished her soft drink yet when she put it down on the 
counter next to the kitchen sink. The thought occurred to her that her 
mother might think that she was through with it and throw it out, but 
she left it there anyway. When Brenda went back to get her drink, her 
mother had already thrown it down the sink. 
Who is responsible for the-Joss of the soft drink? 
I I I I I 
0 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Brenda Both The 
Circumstances 
Brenda should be 
I I I I I 
......................................... 
Punished 
a lot 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
Brenda feels 
I I I I I 
o O O o O O O O O o O O o O ti O o O O O O o O O o O O O o O O O O O O O o O O O O 
Very .bad Indifferent Very good 
Jean saw her friend walking on the other side of the street. Jean yelled 
at her, and when her friend turned to look at who was yelling, she tripped 
on a crack in the sidewalk and fell. She scraped her elbow. 
Who is responsible for the friend's scraped elbow? 
I I I I I 
oooooooooooooooooooo,oooo,000000000000000 
Jean 
Jean should be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 
oGooooooooooooooooooo,0000000000000000000 
Punished 
a lot 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
Jean feels 
I I I I I 
······•••11•••••••0•••···················· 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
\ 
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Bob had been a policeman for three years. He was ordered to the scene 
of a violent family argument. Upon his arrival he was shot in the chest 
by the woman's drunk husband. The man was about to shoot Bob again when 
Bob shot him severing his spinal cord and causing paralysis. 
Who is responsible for severing the man's spinal cord? 
I I I I I 
•oooo•o•oo••••••••••••••••••••••••••o•••• 
Bob 
Bob should be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 
000000• •••••••••••••••O••••• o••••o••••oo• 
Punished 
a lot 
Bob feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I I I I I 
ooooooooooa•o•••••••••••••••••••••••oooc;,,i:J 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
Rick was careful that no one was looking, then he fed some poison 
to the neighbbr' s baby,. 
Who is responsible for poisoning the baby? 
I I I I I 
00 0 Oi:JO O 00 O 000 OOOOOC, 0 0 O 0000 O 000000 00 o O Q 00 0 
Rick 
Rick should be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 
o o o o ooo 0000 o o a o 00000 oo oo • • oo ooo ooo oeo 0000 
Punished 
a lot 
Rick feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I I I I I 
Ot> o O o O 00 00000 000 • 0 O<I ooo 0000 Q o a o oo 000 0 o 000 
, I 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
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Ray was going to cook some hotdogs for his family on the outside grill. 
He went out back with his dog then realized that he had forgotten his 
match~s. Without thinking, he put the hotdogs down on the porch steps 
while he went back inside. When he returned hre found that his dog had 
eaten half of the hotdogs. 
Who is responsible for the dog eating the hotdogs? 
I I I I I 
o••••••••••••o••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Ray 
Ray should be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 0000000001111•••·················••e11••······ 
Punished 
a lot 
Ray feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I I I I I 
.......................................... 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
Peggy's girlfriend borrowed her iron in order to press her mother's 
good white dress. While ironing the dress, her girlfriend slightly 
scorched the back of the sleeve. 
Who is responsible for scorching the dress? 
! I I I I 
000000000<10000000000000000000000000000000 
Peggy Both 
Peggy should be 
I 
I,' 
The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 
oooooooooaoooaooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 
Punished 
a lot 
Peggy feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I I I I I 
ooooooooooooooooociooooooooooooooo •••••• •• 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
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Phil was delivering packages for the grocery store. He rang the door-
bell on one delivery, and as the lady came to open the door, she slip~ed 
on a loose rug and fell. She hit her head hard and it caused her to 
lose\her sight. 
Who is responsible for the lady's loss of sight? 
I I I I I 
•0•0••110•••••···························· 
Phil 
Phil 9hould be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 
.... ,, ..... ., ......................... ., ....... . 
Punished 
a lot 
Phil feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I I I I I 
•oeoo••o••••••••••••o•••••••••••••••••••• 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
Margareta borrowed her neighbor's brand new $12,000 sports car and 
drove it to the drug store late one night. She was in a hurry and 
left the car running while she went inside the store. It had occurred 
to her that it wasn't a good idea to leave the car running as someone 
could steal it and there were several suspicious looking people 
standing outside the store. But she was in a hurry and left the car 
running anyway. While she was in the store, the expensive sports car 
was stolen and never seen again. 
Who is responsible for the loss of the $12,000 car? 
I I I I I 
... o.ooeooo.iooeeo••ctoo•ooe•••••••••••o••••• 
Margareta Both 
M'argareta should be 
The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 
ooeoeooeoeoeeoeee11eee••••e••o••••••o••••• 
Punished 
a lot 
Nothing 
should be done 
Margareta feels 
Rewarded 
a J,.ot 
I I I I I 
o ceoeooeoeeeeeooeoeeoeo •••••11 •••••oo••••• 
r 
Very b,ad Indifferent Very good 
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Harvey's brother took his car without Harvey knowing about it. He took 
the car out to see how fast it would go. While going around a curve he 
lost control of the car and suffered a broken back. 
Who is responsible for the brok~n back? 
V I I I I 
••oo••••••••••o•••o•••••••••••••••••••••• 
Harvey 
Harvey should be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 
OOOGOOOOOOOOOOe0000000C,000G000000VOOOOOOO 
Punished 
a lot 
Harvey feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
i I I I I 
oooooeoooooooooooooooooooooooooooo••••••• 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
Lisa's older brothers told her that they would beat her up if she didn't 
throw a rock through the only unbroken window of the old abandoned house. 
Lisa knew that they meant it and so she threw the rock and broke the 
window. 
Who is resppnsible for the broken window? .i 
U I I I I 
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
Lisa 
Lisa should be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 
oe,oooooooeoooooouoooooooooooooooooooooooo 
Punished 
a lot 
Lisa feels 
Nothing 
shi:luld be done 
·~ 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I I I I I 
••••••••• ., •••••••••••••••••••• 000000000011 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
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81 
82 
KEY SHEET FOR ABSTRACT STORIES 
Principal Level Outcome 
Harold Extended Moderate 
Peggy Selfish Moderate 
Ray Justified Severe 
Rick Careless Moderate 
Lisa Global Severe 
Greta Purposive Severe 
Bill Extended Severe 
Jean Justified Moderate 
Tim Purposive Moderate 
Brenda Careless Severe 
Lynn Global Moderate 
Phil Selfish Severe 
Harold caused something to happen that was slightly bad. He did not 
intend to cause it, and there was no way that he could have known that 
what he did would cause the slightly bad thing. 
Who is responsible for this slightly bad thing? 
I I I I I 
•••o•••ee•o•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Harold 
Harold should be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 
o<t••o•••••••oo•••••••••o••••••••••••••••• 
Punished 
a lot 
Harold feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I I I I I 
•••o•••••••••••••••o•••o••••••••••••••••• 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
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Peg caused something to happen that was slightly bad. She did not intend 
to cause it, but she was aware that she might cause the slightly bad 
thing if she acted. 
Who is responsible for this slightly bad thing? 
I I I I I 
••••ooei,oeo••••••o•eooeooeeeaeo•••••••••• 
Peg 
Peg should be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 
oooooooeeooo••.,•o•••ooeei.oeeo•••••••••••• 
Punished 
a lot 
Peg feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I I I I I 
0011eGoooeoooo•o•••••ooeeo••ooeo•••••o•o•• 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
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Ray caused something to happen that was very bad. He intended to cause 
it, but the circumstances were such that most persons would have done 
the same thing. 
Who is responsible for this very bad thing? 
i I 1 .... r I I 
.......................................... 
Ray 
Ray should be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
i I I I I 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 
Punished 
a lot 
Ray feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
I , 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I I I I I 
•• 0 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
Rick caused something to happen that was slightly bad. He did not intend 
to cause it'~ but if he had been more alert he would have known that what 
he did might· cause the slightly bad. thing. 
Who is responsible for this slightly bad thing? 
i I I I I 
ooeae11000•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••0•• 
Rick 
Rick shm.llld be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
i I I I I 
0 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Punished 
a lot 
Rick feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I I I I I 00000•0••••0••••••0••••0••0••••·········· 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
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Something happend that was very bad. It was caused by a group of which 
Lisa is a member. Lisa was not involved in the action. 
Who is responsible for this very bad thing? 
I I I I I .,. 
o•••••••••••••••••o•••••••••••o••••••••••· 
Ii 
Lisa 
Lisa should be 
Both 
It' 
The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 
eeoo•••••••••o•••••••••o••••••••••••••••• 
Punished 
a lot 
Lisa feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I I I I I 
•••••••••o•••••••o•o••••••••••••••••••••• 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
Greta caused something to happen that was very bad. She intended to 
cause it.· 
Who is responsible for this very bad thing? 
I I I I I 
oeeeo•••••••••••••••oeeoo•••••o•••••••••• 
Greta 
Greta should be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 
oeoeeo•••o••••oo•eoo••••••••••o•••••••••• 
Punished 
a lot 
Greta feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I I I I I 
oe•o•••••••••••o••••••••••••••••••••••o•• 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
Bill caused something to happen that was very bad. He did not intend 
.. ~-
to ·ca~se it, and there was no way that he could have known that what 
he did''would cause the very bad thing. 
Who is responsible for this very bad thing? 
I I I I I 
ooooo•ooooooeooa•eooeooooooooaooeooooo••• 
Bill 
Bill should be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 
ooaoooooooooooooooooaol(lloo111000000000000000 
Punished 
a lot 
Bill feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I '! I I I 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 •. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O O 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
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Jean caused something to happen that was slightly bad. She intended to 
cause it, but the circumstances were such that most persons would have 
done the same thing. 
Who is responsible for this slightly bad thing? 
U I I I I 
oooooeooooooooooooooaooooeooooooooooooooo 
Jean 
Jean should be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 
000000000000000000000000011000000000000000 
Punished 
a lot 
Jean feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I . I I I I 
o o o o o o eooooooe ooao oo o 0000000000 0000000000 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
Tim caused something to happen that was slightly bad. He intended to 
cause it. 
Who is responsible for this slightly bad thing? 
i I I I I 
•o•••••••••••••••••o••••••••••••••••••••• 
Tim 
Tim should be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 000000••································· 
Punished 
a lot 
Tim feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I I I I I 
oo••••·••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
Brenda caused something to happen that was very bad. She did not 
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intend to cause it, but if she had been more alert she would have known ,.. 
that what she did might cause the very bad thing. 
Who is responsible for this very bad thing? 
I I I I I 
ciooo•oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 
Brenda 
Brenda should be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
U I I I I 
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
Punished 
a lot 
Brenda feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
.:'8.ewarded 
a lot 
I I I I I 
aoooooooooooooooooooooouoeooooooooooooooo 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
Something happened that was slightly bad. It was caused by a group 
of which Lynn is a member. Lynn was not involved in the action. 
Who is responsible for this slightly bad thing? 
U I I I I 
00000•0•0000••••0•••••0••••••0•••••0••••• 
Lynn 
Lynn should be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
I U I I I 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••o••••••o•• 
Punished 
a lot 
Lynn feels 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I l I I I 
oeoooo••••~;•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
Phil caused something to happen that was very bad. He did not intend 
to cause itj but he was aware that he might cause this very bad thing 
if he acted. 
Who is responsible for this very bad thing? 
U I I I I 0000000000000•••••••••••0••·············· 
Phil 
Phil should be 
Both The 
Circumstances 
I I I I I 
oooooeooeoooeoooo••••.e••••••••••••••••••• 
Punished 
a lot 
Phil feels 
•' 
Nothing 
should be done 
Rewarded 
a lot 
I i I I I 0000000••································ 
Very bad Indifferent Very good 
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APPENDIX C 
ROTTER INTERNAL - EXTERNAL 
LOCUS OF CONTROL SCALE 
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For each of the following items, read through both sentences. Then 
decide which statement is more true, as far as your~ experience is 
concerned. If you think statement "a-"' is more true for you, fill in 
space 11a" on the answer sheet on the appropri~te line. If you think 
statement "b" is more true, fill in space "b" on the answer sheet. 
l ~ strongly believe that: 
1. a. Children get into trouble because their parents punish them 
too much. 
b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents 
are too easy with them. 
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2. a. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to 
bad luck. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make. 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b. 
One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people 
don't take enough interest in politics. 
There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to 
prevent them. 
In the long run, people get the respect they deserve in this 
world. 
Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes unrecognized 
no matter how hard he tries. 
The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense. 
Most students don't realize the extent to which their grades 
are influenced by accidental happenings. 
Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader. 
Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken 
advantage of their opportunities. 
No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you. 
People who can't get others to like them don't understand how 
to get along with others. 
Heredity plays a major role in determining one's personality. 
It is one's experiences in life which determine what they're 
like. 
I have often found that what is going to happen will happen. 
Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making 
a decision to take a definite course of action. 
10. a. In the case of the well-prepared student, there is rarely if 
ever, such a thing as an unfair test. 
b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course 
work that studying is really useless. 
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11. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or 
nothing to do with it. 
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place 
at the right time. 
12. a. 
b. 
The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions. 
This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not 
much the little guy can do about it. 
13. a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them 
work. 
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things 
turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow. 
14. a. 
b. 
There are certain people who are just no good. 
There is some good in everybody. 
15. a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do 
with luck. 
b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping 
a coin. 
16. a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who is lucky enough to 
be in the right place first. 
b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, luck 
has little or nothing to do with it. 
17. a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the 
victims of forces we can neither understand, nor control. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
2L 
b. By taking an active part in political and social aff~irs the 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b. 
people can control world events. • 
Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are 
controlled by accidental'happenings. 
There really is no such thing as ''luck." 
One should always be willing to admit mistakes. 
It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes. 
It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you. 
How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are. 
In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced 
by the good ones. 
Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, 
laziness or all three. 
22. a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption. 
b. It is difficult for people to have much control over the things 
politicians do in' office. 
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23. a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades 
they give. 
b. There is a direct connection between how hard I stllldy and the 
grades I get. 
24. a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what 
they should do. 
b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are. 
25. a, Many times I feel that I have little influence overithe things 
that happen to me. 1 
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance of luck plays 
an important role in my life. 
26. a\:;._.People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
b. There's not much use in trying hard to please people, if they 
like you~ they like you. 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b. 
a. 
b, 
There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school. 
Team s~~rts are an excellent way to build character. 
What happens to me is my o~m doing. 
Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the 
direction my life is taking. 
Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave 
the way they do. 
In the long run the people are responsible for bad government 
on a national as well as on a local level. 
APPENDIX D 
NEWMAN - KEULS TEST RESULTS 
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KEY FOR NEWMAN - KEULS TESTS 
GA Global Association 
EC = Extended Commission 
CC = Careless Commission 
SC = Selfish Commission 
PC Purposive Commission 
JC Justified Commission 
The larger values mean: 
94 
... with responsibility attribution - more personal responsibility 
... with sanction assignment - more negative sanctions 
... with attribution of emotion - more negative emotions 
-x = 
EC 
JC 
GA 
cc 
SC 
PC 
EC 
4,92 
---
ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY -
CONTEXTUAL STORIES 
JC GA cc 
10.87 19.07 29.52 
5.95 14.15* 24. 60* 
---
8,20* 18. 65*· 
---
10.45* 
---
1(p,::. 0 05 
q2 = 7,52 
q3 = 9.02 
q4 9,88 
q5 10,53 
q6 11. 01 
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SC PC 
33.55 35.60 
28. 63,'<' 30.68* 
22.68* 24,73* 
14,48* 16.53* 
4,03 6.08 
---
2.05 
I ---
x = 
GA 
EC 
cc 
SC 
JC 
PC 
GA 
1.82 
---
ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY -
ABSTRACT STORIES 
EC cc SC 
10.62 25.35 25.90 
s. 80,'c' 23.53* 24,08* 
--- 14. 73* 15.28* 
--- .55 
---
*p<::. . 05 
q2 6.03 
q3 7.24 
q4 7.93 
q5 = 8.44 
q6 = 8.83 
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JC PC 
26.90 37.67 
25.08* 35.85* 
16.28* 21. 05·,'( 
1. 55 12.32* 
' 
I 1. 0 11. 77·k 
' 
---
10. 77,'( 
---
x = 
EiC 
CIC 
JC 
GA 
SC 
PC 
EC 
19,40 
---
*PL, 05 
q2 = 2,99 
q3 = 3,59 
q4 = 3,93 
q5 = 4.18 
q6 = 4,38 
SANCTION ASSIGNMENT -
CONTEXTUAL STORIES 
cc JC GA 
21.40 21,42 21.47 
2.00 2.02 2.07 
---
.02 , 07 
---
, 05 
---
97 
SC PC 
25.60 33.65 
6.20* 14.25* 
4.20* 12. 25"' 
4. 16i( 12.23* 
4.13* 12.18* 
--- 8,05* 
---
GA 
x = 18.87 
GA ---
EC 
cc 
SC 
JC 
PC 
*P '. 05 
q2 = 3.41 
q3 = 4. 09 
q4 = 4.48 
q5 = 4. 77 
q6 = 4.99 
SANCTION ASSIGNMENT -
ABSTRACT STORIES 
EC cc SC 
20.65 23.65 26.00 
1. 78 4. 78* 7 .13·k 
--- 3.00 5.35* 
---
2. 35'>'( 
---
98 
JC PC 
27.75 34.42 
8.88* 15.55* 
7.10* 13. 77* 
4. lO'>'r 10. 77* 
1. 75 8.42* 
---
6. 6 7,"r 
---
PC 
x = 18,45 
PC ---
JC 
GA 
SC 
EC 
cc 
*P~ ,05 
q2 = 4,95 
q3 = 5.93 
q4 = 6.50 
~] 6.92 
q6 7.24 
ATTRIBUTION OF EMOTION -
ABSTRACT STORIES 
JC GA SC 
22.90 25.10 25.32 
4,45 6,65* 6,87* 
---
2,20 2.42 
--- .22 
---
99 
EC cc 
27.12 29.85 
8.67* 11.40* 
4.22 6.95* 
2.02 4. 75 
1. 80 4.53 
--- 2.73 
---
x = 
PC 
JC 
SIC 
EC 
GA 
CCC 
PC 
19,40 
to::.lc=>C"a 
*P~, 05 
q2 = 3,70 
q3 = 4.44 
q4 = 4.87 
q5 5.18 
q6 5.Li.2 
ATTRIBUTION OF EMOTION -
CONTEXTUAL STORIES 
JC SC EC 
29,37 30,37 30.45 
9.97* 10.97* 11. 05* 
==- 1. 00 1. 08 
---
. 08 
---
100 
GA cc 
34.12 34.50 
14. 72* 15,10* 
4.75 5.13* 
3.75 4.13 
3.67 4.05 
=-- .38 
---
APPENDIX E 
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KEY FOR SIMPLE EFFECTS TESTS 
M = Story Method 
A 
M1 = Contextual Stories 
M = Abstract Stories 2 
Level of Responsibility 
A1 Global Association 
Az Extended Commission 
A3 Careless Commission 
A4 Selfish Commission 
A5 Purposive Commission 
A6 Justified Commission 
B Outcome Intensity 
B1 = Moderate Outcome 
B2 = Severe Outcome 
102 
SUMMARY OF SIMPLE EFFECTS TESTS ON THE 
ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY 
M x A Interaction 
Source df MS F 
Mat A1 1 11902. 50 101. 60 
A2 1 1299.60 11.09 
A3 1 697.23 5.95 
A4 1 2340.90 19.98 
A5 1 172. 23 1.47 
A6 1 10272.03 87.68 
A at Ml 5 12775.43 109.05 
M2 5 13284.11 113 .40 
Error 190 117 .15 
*p .t!,. . • 02 
103 
** 
* 
** 
SUMMARY OF SIMPLE EFFECTS TESTS ON THE 
ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY 
Ax B Interaction 
Source df MS F 
B at A1 1 22.05 0.55 
A2 1 294.45 7.38 
A3 1 74.11 1. 86 
A4 1 288.8 7.24 
A5 1 1. 01 0.03 
A6 1 66.61 1. 67 
A at Bl 5 4506.37 112. 97 
B2 5 6009. 04 150.64 
Error 190 39.89 
*p ~. 001 
104 
* 
* 
* 
* 
SUMMARY OF SIMPLE EFFECTS TESTS ON 
SANCTION ASSIGNMENT 
M x Ax B 
Source df MS 
A at Bl M1 5 255.45 
B1 M2 5 1216.97 
B2 M1 5 444.73 
B2 M2 5 822.81 
Mat A1 B1 1 115.6 
A1 B2 1 32.4 
A2 B1 1 14.4 
A2 B2 1 16.9 
A3 B1 1 4.22 
A3 B2 1 148.22 
A4·B1 1 207.00 
A4 B2 1 140. 62 
A5 B1 1 52.9 
A5 B2 1 5.62 
A6 B1 1 25.6 
A6 B2 1 1113. 02 
B at Al Ml 1 7.23 
Al M2 1 5.63 
A2 M1 1 0.4 
A2 M2 1 0.9 
A3 M1 1 0.1 
A3 M2 1 108.9 
A4 Ml 1 1502.3 
A4 M2 1 129.6 
A5 M1 1 672.4 
A5 M2 1 265.23 
A6 M1 1 308.03 
A6 M2 1 115.6 
Error 190 15.595 
:• 
*PL. 01 
**P"'-., 001 
F 
16.38 
78.04 
28.52 
52.72 
7.41 
2.09 
0.93 
1. 08 
0.27 
9.50 
13.80 
9. 02 · 
3.39 
0.36 
1.64 
71.37 
0.46 
0.36 
0.03 
0.06 
0.00 
6.98 
96.30 
8.31 
43.12 
17.01 
19.75 
7 .41 
** 
** 
** 
** 
* 
* 
** 
* 
** 
* 
** 
* 
** 
** 
** 
* 
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Source 
BM at A1 
A2 
A3 
A4 
A5 
A6 
AB at Ml 
M2 
AM at B1 
B2 
Error 
*p~ .01 
SUMMARY OF SIMPLE EFFECTS TESTS ON 
SANCTION ASSIGNMENT 
M x A x B 
df MS F 
1 148.05 9.49 
1 32.55 2.08 
1 210.25 13.48 
1 740.137 47 .46 
1 949.64 60.89 
1 1161. 74 74.49 
5 1496.19 95.94 
5 1358.29 87.10 
5 299. 72 19.22 
5 2069.23 132.69 
190 15.595 
**p4" 001 
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* 
** 
** 
** 
** 
SUMMARY OF SIM.PLE £¥FECTS TESTS ON 
ATTRIBUTION OF EMOTION 
Source df MS 
Mat Al B1 1 1000.00 
A1 B2 1 648.02 
A2 B1 l 86.75 
A2 B2 l 136. 90 
A3 Bl 1 164.03 
A3 B2 1 275.63 
A4 B1 1 18.20 
A4 B2 l 765.62 
A5 B1 1 11.03 
A5 B2 1 87. 03 
A6 B1 1 756.90 
A6 B2 1 180.63 
Bat Al Ml l 27 .23 
A1 M2 1 0.90 
A2 Ml 1 202.50 
A2 Mz 1 140.62 
A3 Ml 1 336.40 
A3 Mz 1 211. 60 
A4 Mt 1 1452.03 
A4 M2 l 216.23 
A5 M:1 l lOoOO 
As M2 1 90.00 
A6 Ml l 70.23 
A6 M2 1 32.4,0 
Error 190 31.26 
*p .e., 05 
**p< 0 01 
***'p~.001 
F 
31.9 
20.7 
2.8 
4.4 
5.3 
8.8 
0.6 
24.5 
0.4 
2.8 
24.2 
5.8 
0.9 
0.03 
6.5 
4.5 
10.8 
6.8 
46.5 
609 
0.3 
2.9 
2.3 
1.1 
* 
* 
** 
*** 
* 
* 
* 
** 
** 
107 
APPENDIX F 
LOCUS OF CONTROL TEST RESULTS 
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SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR 
ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY 
WITH CONTEXTUAL STORIES 
Source of Variation df MS 
Between 1s 
Locus of Control (C) 1 144.15 
C x Ss w. groups 18 525.64 
Within Ss 
Story Level (A) 5 6387.71 
C x A 5 160.97 
A x 1s w. groups 90 144.24 
Outcome Intensity (B) 1 190.82 
C x B 1 70.42 
B x Ss w. groups 18 52.48 
A x B 5 171.10 
C x Ax B 5 42.44 
Ax B Ss w. groups 90 42.52 
109 
F 
0.27 
44.29 
1.12 
3.64 
1.34 
4.02 
.99 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR 
ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY 
WITH ABSTRACT STORIES 
Source of Variation df MS 
Between Ss 
Locus of Control (C) 1 495.94 
C x Ss w. groups 18 350.58 
Within Ss 
Story Level (A) 5 6642.05 
C x A 5 23.03 
Ax Ss w. groups 90 92.87 
Outc;me Intensity (B) 1 3.50 
C x B 1 2.60 
B x Ss w. groups 18 43.12 
Ax B 5 23.03 
C x A x B 5 8.14 
Ax B x -2,s w, groups 90 38.99 
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F 
1.42 
71.52 
0.25 
0.08 
0.06 
0.59 
0.20 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR 
SANCTION ASSIGNMENT WITH 
CONTEXTUAL STORIES 
Source of Variation df MS 
Between Ss 
Locus of Control (C) 1 1. 07 
C x Ss w. groups 18 52.83 
Within Ss 
Story Level (A) 5 1091.40 
C x A 5 13.69 
A x ~s w. groups 90 22.82 
Outcome Intensity (B) 1 326.67 
C x B 1 8.82 
B x Ss w. groups 18 18.51 
Ax B 5 415.52 
C x Ax B 5 36.73 
Ax Bx Ss w. groups 90 20.41 
111 
F 
0.02 
47 .82 
0.60 
17. 65 
0.48 
20.36 
1.80 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR 
SANCTION ASSIGNMENT WITH 
ABSTRACT STORIES 
Source of Variation df MS 
Between Ss 
Locus of Control (C) 1 281. 67 
c x Ss w. groups 18 67.93 
Within Ss 
Story Level (A) 5 1242.80 
C x A 5 2.19 
A x Ss w. groups 90 29.55 
Outcome Intensity (B) 1 426.67 
C x B 1 .15 
Bx Ss w. groups 18 14.95 
A x B 5 33.54 
C x A x B 5 25.46 
A x B x 3s w. groups 90 9.06 
112 
F 
4.15 
42.06 
0.07 
28.55 
0.01 
3. 70 
2.81 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR 
ATTRIBUTION OF EMOTION WITH 
CONTEXTUAL STORIES 
Source of Variation df MS 
-
Between Ss 
Locus of Control (C) 1 2.20 
C x Ss w. groups 18 99.22 
Within Ss 
Story Level (A) 5 1198.67 
C x A 5 71. 61 
A x .§.s w. grou.ps 90 34.95 
Outcome Intensity (B) 1 604. 84 
C x B 1 71.50 
Bx Ss w. groups 18 48.85 
Ax B 5 298. 71 
C x Ax B 5 25.95 
A x Bx Ss w. groups 90 35.97 
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F 
0.02 
// 
34.30 
2.05 
12.38 
1.46 
8.30 
o. 72 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR 
ATTRIBUTION OF EMOTION WITH 
ABSTRACT STORIES 
Source of Variation df MS 
Between Ss 
Locus of Control (C) 1 1.35 
C x Ss w. groups 18 211. 82 
Within Ss 
Story Level (A) 5 601.65 
C x A 5 77. 70 
Ax Ss w. groups 90 62.48 
Outcome Intensity (B) 1 244.02 
C x B 1 16.02 
B x Ss w. groups. 18 34.03 
Ax B 5 89.55 
C x Ax B 5 49.87 
Ax B x Ss w. groups 90 25.81 
.. 
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F 
0.01 
9.63 
1.24 
7.17 
0.47 
3.47 
1.93 
APPENDIX G 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE CORRELATIONS 
115 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS ACROSS LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY 
AND OUTCOME INTENSITY WITH BOTH .METHODS COMBINED 
Level of Outcome 
Responsibility Intensity R - S 
Global Moderate .263 
Association Severe .400** 
Extended Moderate - .023 
Commission Severe .109 
Careless Moderate .235 
Commission Severe .374** 
Selfish Moderate .107 
Commission Severe .449** 
· Purposive Moderate .379** 
Commission Severe .694** 
Justified Moderate .503** 
Commission Severe .622** 
*p~.03 
**p<. .01 
R - E S - E 
.185 535 * * 
.295 .153 
-.046 - .035 
.225 . 075 
.476** ~ 163 
.650** .163 
-.332 -.08 
.371** .143 
.038 .033 
-.041 .050 
-.326* -.007 
-.325* -.245 
R = Responsibility Attribution 
S = Sanction Assignment 
E = Attribution of Emotion 
..... 
..... 
0\ 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS ACROSS LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY 
AND OUTCOME INTENSITY WITH CONTEXTUAL STORIES 
Level of Outcome 
Responsibility Intensity R - S R - E S - E 
Global Moderate .101 -.499* .150 
Association Severe .427 ... 086 .014 
Extended Moderate -,,174 -.426 .129 
Commission Severe • 081 .. 075 .072 
Careless Moderate .• 204 .408 -.001 
Commission Severe .419 . 704** .321 
Selfish Moderate .419 -.506* -.509* 
Commission Severe .328 .319 - .104 
Purposi~.e Moderate .363 .244 -.031 
Commis-sion Severe .697** .174 .389 
-
Justified Moderate .426 .117 .189 
Commission Severe -.120 .027 -~ 137 
*P ..::- • 02 
**p.C::. 01 R = Responsibility Attribution 
Sc Sanction Assignment 
E = Attribution of Emotion 
..... 
..... 
" 
CORRELATIONS COEFFICIENTS ACROSS LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY 
AND OUTCOME INTENSITY WITH ABSTRACT STORIES 
Level of Outcome 
Responsibility Intensity R - S 
Global Moderate .118 
Association Severe .174 
Extended Moderate .056 
Commission Severe -.019 
Careless Moderate .391 
Commission Severe .489* 
Selfish Moderate .371 
Commission Severe .428 
Pu;posive Moderate .430 
COt!lmission Severe .791** 
Justified Moderate .565** 
Commission Severe .717** 
"*P ~. 04 
**p <. 01 
R - E 
-.006 
.299 
. 560,~* 
.462* 
.425 
.654** 
-.294 
- . 047 
-.209 
-.332 
-.355 
- . 309 
S - E 
.664** 
.947 
-.166 
.214 
.469* 
.456* 
.176 
- . 097 
.046 
-.316 
-.012 
-.100 
R = Responsibility Attribution 
S = Sanction Assignment 
E = Attribution of Emotion 
..... 
..... 
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